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In light of the societal changes wrought by the 
coronavirus pandemic, this report aims to examine the 
impact this crisis had on the general cybersecurity 
landscape, notably in terms of the attack surface and 
exploitation opportunities; to investigate the changing 
and recurring patterns of adversarial behaviors; and to 
illustrate and provide an overview of how threats actors 
have leveraged said epidemic in Q1/Q2 2020.  
Accordingly, this report highlights that the 
coronavirus pandemic has generated a set of 
remarkable and psycho-societal, technical, and 
logistical-economic circumstances upon which malicious 
actors have capitalized. These factors include:  
1) an expanded socio-technical attack surface 
due to the greater use and dependency on 
services and applications for telework 
provided through digital infrastructure in 
general and cloud infrastructure in 
particular;  
2) a psycho-informational environment 
characterized by anxiety, uncertainty, and 
high demand for information;  
3) a nexus of economic and trade uncertainty/ 
disruption, emergency procurement 
processes, compounded by the wide 
availability of nefarious cyber tools.  
Additionally, the analysis of coronavirus-related 
cyber threats has underlined that, despite some alarmist 
public reporting, some degree of continuity can be 
found, notably with respect to  the dynamic nature and 
types of attacks observed, the types of threat actors, and 
the overall volume of certain cyber threats (e.g. phishing 
and malspam). Adversarial behavior has nonetheless 
changed and evolved in at least four important respects:  
1) Many threat actors were directly affected by 
the pandemic and had to adapt their criminal 
business models, leading to a reduction in 
certain types of threats and an increase in 
others. This was also reflected in the 
grayware and darkweb marketplaces. 
2) The scale, sophistication, and modus 
operandi of certain cyberattacks has 
increased or evolved. Coronavirus-related 
credential phishing and ransomware were 
among the most prolific threats in terms, 
with threat actors deploying evermore 
sophisticated ploys (e.g. double extortion, 
shorter reconnaissance requirements, more 
powerful and complex denial of service 
attacks) against larger targets. Increased 
cooperation between threat actors has also 
been recorded.  
3) While all sectors have been targeted in some 
way or other, threat actors have increasingly 
shifted from individuals to the critical 
infrastructure sectors most affected and 
under pressure by the pandemic. 
Geographically, targeting focused on areas 
particularly affected by the pandemic 
following hotspots as the first wave of 
infections made its way around the world. 
4) The motivations of state-sponsored actors 
have expanded to coronavirus-related 
espionage targeting healthcare and research 
infrastructure.  
Lastly, the cyber threat landscape of Q1/Q2 2020 
is characterized by heightened risks and a plethora of 
threats, from ransomware to credential phishing, and 
business email compromise.  
While some qualification of threat perspectives 
has set in following an initial rise of blanket concern, 
ample opportunities for abuse and adaptation remain, 
especially as the “special” circumstances will endure. 
This report thus emphasizes the value of three key 
recommendations: 
1. As economic pressure increases and cyber 
threats continue to grow and adapt, the 
importance of cybersecurity awareness-
raising, capacity building, and 
communication to all stakeholders will be 
critical, not limited to but with a particular 
focus on  authentication methods and basic 
cyber-hygiene.  
2. Quality threat intelligence, information 
exchange, cooperation, and coordination 
between all stakeholders are critical for 
fostering a better understanding and more 
comprehensive perspective of the evolving 
cyber threat landscape, bringing institutional 
gaps into view, and fostering trust. The 
efforts and initiatives various stakeholders 
took in this direction during the first six 
months of the pandemic should therefore be 
continued as much as possible. 
3. The accelerated digitization and 
expanded adoption of telework has 
brought the issues of remote and cloud 
security to the forefront of cybersecurity 
efforts. Besides all the security flaws and 
vulnerabilities linked to widely popular 
cloud-based applications, users and 
companies, especially SMEs, need to 
start addressing the issues around the 





use of personal devices and 
configuration of remote access 
technologies.  







The coronavirus is not only a health hazard but also 
cause for worries in the digital domain. As the 
coronavirus pandemic has been ravaging the world for 
the past year, upending the livelihood of billions and 
transforming social and professional norms, malicious 
actors in cyberspace have jumped at the chance of 
exploiting this crisis and the unique circumstances it has 
created for their benefit. As the months went by, the 
cybersecurity community and a rising number of media 
outlets have been apt to report on new cyberattacks 
involving the coronavirus – and there were plenty. 
However, in the first half of 2020, the general media and 
private-sector reporting on these issues has been 
fraught with exaggerations of increased volume and 
novelty, leading to a general narrative that the cyber 
threat situation during the first two quarters of 2020 
was without precedent (e.g. Arampatzis, 2020; Check 
Point Software Technologies, 2020a; Miller, 2020; 
Richardson and Mahle, 2020). While this is an appealing 
narrative – echoing that of the pandemic at large – its 
underpinnings need to be critically assessed before any 
definitive conclusion can be made.  
Cyber threats – whether they include the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in software and hardware 
or of the fear and lack of awareness of users or cyber-
enabled disinformation – are by nature a dynamic 
phenomenon that reacts to the evolving analog and 
digital environments. This is even more true for an event 
of this magnitude, transformation potential, and global 
reach.  
As a result, we would reasonably expect change 
and adaptation to occur on both ends of the 
cybersecurity/-defense spectrum – i.e. attackers and 
defenders. In the case of adversarial behavior (the focus 
of this report), this could concern the issues of targets, 
motivations or the modus operandi of malicious actors. 
This is likely to be particularly true as the pandemic has 
fostered new opportunities for malicious actors as the 
attack surface increased – notably due to the move 
toward telework and the climate of fear and uncertainty 
surrounding the pandemic. These “opportunities” are 
principally linked to socio--technical changes and not 
any radical technical innovation or transformation, 
meaning that we should expect relative continuity in 
terms of the techniques and tools used for these attacks. 
Adaptation should, however, be expected in terms of 
how the malicious actors leveraged the crisis for their 
cyberattacks.  
Analyzing the extent to which this hypothesis and 
expectations are true and are reflected in qualitative 
                                                                
1 This includes, for instance, major technology newspapers or blogs, 
such as Krebs on Security, ZDNet or Schneier on Security.  
2 This includes, for instance, major security and technology vendors, 
such as Kaspersky, Proofpoint, Symantec (Broadcom), CrowdStrike, 
and quantitative analysis of the data – while 
acknowledging its incomplete and anecdotal nature – is 
thus the underlying goal of this report.  The more 
specific aims of this report are threefold:  
First, it aims to examine the impact the 
coronavirus epidemic has had on the general 
cybersecurity landscape, notably in terms of the attack 
surface and exploitation opportunities. Second, this 
study aims at shedding some light on both the changing 
and recurring patterns of adversarial behaviors in this 
space – in other words: changes and continuities. Third, 
to put things into perspective, it aims at illustrating and 
providing an overview of how the epidemic has been 
leveraged by threats actors.  
Accordingly, the structure of this report reflects 
these overarching objectives. The first section, following 
an introductory section that sets the context and 
discusses how the pandemic has socio-technically 
affected the attack surface, discusses and highlights 
specific observed changes and continuities in adversarial 
behavior. In the second, more descriptive section, the 
landscape of coronavirus-related cyber threats is laid 
out. It provides a snapshot of the actors, their tactics, 
and their targets. While cyber-enabled influence 
operations have been of considerable importance and 
prevalence throughout this pandemic, this report 
focuses on “conventional” cyberattacks, such as 
phishing, distributed denial of service (DDoS) or business 
email compromise (BEC) attacks. The report then 
concludes by summing up the main findings alongside 
some open-ended thoughts with regard to preparations 
for future developments.  
As a general disclaimer, this report was 
conducted based on open-source material only. This 
includes reporting from (mostly western) journalistic1, 
commercial, specialized2, governmental, and 
intergovernmental sources. Given the short time span 
between the events and this report, very little academic 
literature exists. Furthermore, due to the nature of the 
available reporting – which significantly depends on 
discovery, self-reporting, and economic interests of 
threat intelligence companies – threat observations 
generally do not cover all stakeholder groups and 
geographic areas to an equal extent. Lastly, due to the 
general challenges of recording cyberattacks (i.e. based 
on reporting and detection) that impede a complete 
accounting, incident rates and dates need to be viewed 
with an element of caution. These limitations 
notwithstanding, this report provides a broad overview 
of how attack surfaces and threat actor behavior have 
evolved during the first six months of 2020 (1 January to 
30 June), and of the resulting security challenges. 
 
McAffee, Microsoft, CheckPoint Software Technologies, F-Secure, 
Cisco Talos, Google or Trend Micro.  





1 Cyber Threat 
Landscape: Dynamics 
 
The first six months following the outbreak of the 
coronavirus have been marked by adaptation. Students, 
workers, hospitals, schools, universities, governments, 
businesses large and small had to come to terms with a 
new socio-technical environment in the collective effort 
to bridge over the social and physical distances resulting 
from safety protocols. They were not the only ones. 
Cybercriminals and state-sponsored hacking groups 
(often referred to as advanced persistent threats (APTs)) 
have followed suit and adapted their attack patterns in 
an attempt to take advantage of the expanded attack 
surface linked to the increasing virtualization of social, 
economic, and political interactions. However, despite 
the various operational and behavioral changes, 
continuity, most notably in terms of threat actors, 
volume of cyberattacks and the techniques used, 
emerges as an underlying characteristic of the cyber 
threat landscape during that time-period.  
The following paragraphs lay out these different 
dynamics in more detail: the first subsection (1.1) 
provides context as to the changing attack surface, 
outlining how these changes have provided new 
opportunities for abuse; the second subsection (1.2) 
describes some of the main resulting changes in 
adversarial behavior; the third subsection (1.3) 
underlines the general continuity of the dominant the 
cyber threat trends as they existed before the 
coronavirus outbreak.  
1.1 Changes in the Attack Surface: Use of 
Technology and User Behavior 
 
Over the past few years, cyberattacks and cyber 
operations have become more numerous and prevalent. 
A confluence of factors contributes to this phenomenon, 
including the increase in digitalization of our societies, 
the exacerbating geopolitical tension between states 
controlling formidable cyber capabilities that extends 
competition into the digital sphere, and the 
fragmentation of the Internet. These high-level 
developments receive reinforcement  at the operational 
level from the speed, global reach, and the relative low 
cost and ease with which malicious cyber operations can 
be conducted. Combined with adversary assumptions 
about possible responses to their malicious actions, 
these defining features of cyber operations have led to 
perceptions of low risks of escalation and high potential 
reward, predicated on difficulties in the political 
attribution of attacks, and low costs of entry for both 
state-sponsored actors and criminals3.  
                                                                
3 Assessments in this vein are necessarily contextual and depend on 
the target and type of the cyberattack. An attack against a critical 
During the first six months of this pandemic, the 
same dynamics have generally persisted and can 
account – to some extent – for the continued intensity 
in cyberattacks. Coupled with these underlying factors, 
the pandemic has enhanced and created a new set of 
vulnerabilities, which expanded the exploitable attack 
surface leveraged by threat actors. Specifically, the 
working and communication realities brought on by the 
pandemic have significantly altered the use of certain 
technology, the behavior of users, and the economic-
logistical environment. Put differently, the socio-
technical, psychological-informational, logistical-
economic changes wrought by the pandemic have 
created new opportunities for cyber threat actors.  
1.1.1 Socio-technical Factors: Telework and 
Lockdowns Spurred Exploitable Technical and 
Behavioral Vulnerabilities  
 
The first factor is socio-technical in nature and relates to 
the rapid transition towards remote work, the change in 
working procedures/habits, and the subsequently 
increase reliance of all layers of society on digital 
infrastructure and services. Together, these trends have 
not only expanded the attack surface but have also 
made adjusting organizations more vulnerable to both 
infiltration and exploitation.  
 
Teleworking Infrastructure and Habits 
 
Many organizations, from large governmental bodies to 
multinational businesses and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), have transitioned towards remote 
work – often in a rush to maintain business and 
operational continuity. In many cases, organizations 
lacked the time, preparation, plans, capabilities, 
cybersecurity awareness, or knowledge to do so 
effectively, risking to improperly set up these systems 
and make them vulnerable to attacks.  
The unprecedented surge in remote work has led 
to an increase in Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol 
(RDP) usage. The Internet indexing service Shodan 
reported a 41 per cent increase in the number of RDP 
endpoints available on the Internet in March (Shodan, 
2020). The rapid proliferation of RDPs, however, made it 
harder for IT experts seeking to secure their 
organizations or institutions to identify unauthorized 
network connections, and thus offered hackers a chance 
blend in with legitimate traffic to gain access to internal 
networks (Mehrotra et al., 2020; Wiggen, 2020). 
Additionally, many of these RDPs  – due to time and 
scaling constraints – were misconfigured and left 
exposed – at least 4.7 million as of the end of March 
(Aprozper, 2020; Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency and National Cyber Security Centre, 2020). 
infrastructure would have a greater escalation potential than an 
isolated attack against a small business.  





These two dynamics, coupled with renewed motivation 
and opportunity for such attacks, have resulted in an 
increase in RDP brute force attacks, with cybercrime 
groups usually putting captured RDP credentials up for 
sale on so-called "RDP shops" (Cimpanu, 2020a; Galov, 
2020). 
The increasing dependency on remote-access 
solutions and connections for operational continuity has 
also accentuated the potential (economic and business) 
impact of DDoS attacks against RDPs and virtual private 
networks (VPNs). These developments also help explain 
the re-emergence of extortion DDoS as well as the 
various attacks meant to overwhelm Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) (Hope, 2020a; Nexusguard, 2020; Zurier, 
2020). Indeed, the massive increase and redistribution 
of bandwidths for remote work has led to a decrease in 
bandwidths available to defend against DDoS attacks, 
which now have a stronger potential to cause disruption 
and downtime. These issues can be mitigated by a 
variety of techniques but need a level of planning and 
preparedness that many organizations, most notably 
SMEs, did not readily have at their disposal (iDefense, 
2020). 
*** 
As an aside, it is worth noting that national 
lockdown measures were top-down decisions imposed 
by governments, granting companies little control and 
foresight on the timeline to comply with these 
measures. This dynamic highlights the influence of 
emergency trade-offs and the need to find a time-
sensitive way to balance concerns of health security and 
cybersecurity that allow for the reduction of potential 
tension between efforts to protect employees from 
health risks and to slow down infection rates by moving 
employees quickly into remote office and ensuring the 
security of the technology that would need to enable 
this new working mode.  
In response, many in the cybersecurity 
community have sought to counterbalance this sudden 
tilt toward health security by increasing their services, 
funding, and attention towards the (not-so-new) risks 
and vulnerabilities of these technologies. For instance, 
some specialized (inter-)governmental agencies (e.g. the 
UK National Cyber Security Center, Singapore’s Cyber 
Security Agency or the US Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)), private 
companies (e.g. KPMG, E&Y, McKinsey, PwC), and 
cybersecurity community organizations (e.g. the 
European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO)) published 
dedicated best-practice guides, standards, and alerts to 
raise cybersecurity awareness about the types of 
cyberattacks and ways of protecting oneself online 
during this pandemic. Among these, some dedicated 
guides were explicitly devised for SMEs (e.g. by the 
Scottish government, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity 
                                                                
4 CrowdStrike commissioned YouGov PLC to conduct an online survey 
of 4048 senior decision-makers in Australia, France, Germany, Great 
(ENISA), and the European Digital SME Alliance) and for 
the healthcare sector (e.g. ENISA).  
In addition, some governments, including in the 
UK, have provided dedicated funding to boost 
cybersecurity (e.g. for training and certification) for 
sectors under particular duress, such as healthcare (Gov 
UK, 2020). Another important measure was the creation 
of “COVID-19 cybersecurity response packages” by 
different cybersecurity communities. One notable 
example is the “Cyber Solidarity Campaign”, launched by 
ECSO and its partners, which gave free access to a 
package of national and international tools, insights, and 
expertise (ECSO, 2020).  Similarly, the International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) initiative CYB4COVID 
was set up as a one-stop shop to provide a repository for 
many of these resources. 
*** 
In addition to the security risks linked to the use 
of RDPs and some negligence in their setting up, the shift 
to remote office has also entailed that many IT systems 
lost their institutionalized protections. Indeed, many 
workplaces usually benefit from IT personnel tasked 
with the protection of internal networks, detection of 
threats, and regular patching of software  (Wiggen, 
2020). Compared to this infrastructure, private IT 
devices, such as phones and computers, and home 
networks are often less well secured, encrypted, and 
updated. Indeed, privately used computers often lack 
professional antivirus protection programs or firewalls 
and can run software that can have severe (unpatched) 
security gaps – either because of the quality of the 
software, lack of cyber hygiene on the part of the user, 
or products having reached the end of their support 
cycle (Wiggen, 2020).  
To compensate for these shortcomings, many 
companies provided its workers with up-to-date (e.g. 
with encryption or firewall) work computers, dedicated 
VPNs, and teleworking tools. Some also reinforced their 
IT support for troubleshooting and explaining these new 
tools, which were new for many employees. However, 
many organizations did not or were not able to do so, 
whether for financial or practical reasons.  As a result, 
many employees did end up using their own devices. 
According to a survey commissioned by the 
cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, which interviewed 4000 
senior decision-makers in various countries4, 60 per cent 
of the respondents reported that they were using their 
personal devices to complete work (Sentonas, 2020). 
The same survey also revealed that a majority of 
companies (53 per cent) did not provide any additional 
cybersecurity training on the risks associated with 
remote work. This was particularly the case for SMEs, 
where 69 per cent of respondents reported to have 
received no additional cybersecurity training (Sentonas, 
2020). A recent study has highlighted a similar trend for 
Britain, India, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore and the US. Fieldwork 
was undertaken in the period 14-29 April 2020. 





Swiss SMEs (Vifian et al., 2020). Awareness challenges 
contributed to these technical risk factors. A large 
majority of the respondents (89 per cent) were 
optimistic about their personal devices’ cybersecurity 
and readily downloaded sensitive data on their personal 
devices. A significant share – around one in three in the 
UK – are not concerned about cybersecurity at all 
(Coker, 2020).  Other surveys, notably by the VPN 
company Twingate and technology firm IBM, tend to 
support these general trends (IBM, 2020; Twingate, 
2020).  
Not all industries, however, have shifted to home 
office – with the subsequent loss of protection – in the 
same way. In Switzerland for instance, Deloitte 
conducted a similar survey with over 1500 respondents 
across different industries. While some results are very 
similar to those reported by CrowdStrike, the Deloitte 
survey highlighted that the public sector had difficulties 
(or more reticence) to transition to home office 
compared to other industries. According to the survey, 
65 per cent of the workforce in the ICT sector worked 
completely from home, 50 per cent in finance and 
insurance sectors whilst only 25 per cent on average for 
the public sector5 (Deloitte, 2020). Among the different 
difficulties, one finds the lack of technical support, 
delays in hardware delivery, and incompatible software 
(e.g. to access data). Indeed, only 29 per cent of 
employees working within administrations surveyed 
said that their employers immediately offered the 
technical support needed to enable them to work from 
home during the pandemic (Deloitte, 2020). Meanwhile, 
a significant majority of the civil servants surveyed (71 
per cent) expressed frustration because the technical 
equipment to enable them to work from home took 
several days or even weeks to arrive or was never 
delivered at all (Deloitte, 2020). Finally, 58 per cent of 
civil servants surveyed said they did not have the right 
software to access data (Deloitte, 2020). In addition to 
the disruption caused to the usual work process and 
attention that could be leveraged by threat actors, the 
shift to home office in the public sector has for the most 
part been underlined with concerns around the issue of 
protecting sensitive and confidential data and the 
related risk of cyberespionage. In particular, the rapid 
reliance on third party/private software, tools and 
platforms for virtual collaboration and digital exchange 
reinforced the risks of data leaks.  
Emblematic of the pandemic and the “new 
normal,” remote work for most organizations implicated 
a shift towards teleworking technologies, such as the 
cloud-based conferencing tools Zoom or Microsoft 
Teams (see figure 1) and VPNs (see section 2.2.1). These 
technologies and their large-scale use, however, at the 
same time created  high-value target sets that malicious 
                                                                
5 A more detailed breakdown for the public sector shows teleworking 
of 33 per cent for thefederal level, 27 per cent for the cantonal level, 
and 15 per cent for the municipal level (Deloitte, 2020). 
actors tried to exploit, whether for criminal purposes or 
for economically or politically motivated espionage. By 
way of example, it is worth recalling that early on in this 
crisis, the UK’s cabinet held meetings through Zoom 
(Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency and 
National Cyber Security Centre, 2020; McAfee, 2020a). 
However, many of these teleworking technologies 
suffered from security vulnerabilities – sometimes due 
to coding errors, misleading claims (e.g. about 
encryption), or rushed expansion of their services. 
Malicious actors have actively sought and sold such 
vulnerabilities on the dark web. Their widespread – and 
relatively new – usage (and thus potential reward) made 
these particular technologies prominent targets of 
cyberattacks, such as credential stealing, phishing, and 
brute force attacks (see section 2.2.1).  
 
Figure 1: Increase in the usage of teleworking technologies - 
January to mid-March (McAfee, 2020a) 
 
In addition to the technical vulnerabilities it has 
created or enhanced, the shift to telework also affected 
various organizational procedures and work/life habits, 
contributing to an expanded attack surface and 
exposure to malicious activity – notably scams and 
business email compromise.  Among these, several 
factors have helped criminals harvest details or divert 
millions of dollars from government and companies 
(Interpol, 2020a). One factor was that to protect the 
health of their workers and address the urgent need for 
protective material, many organizations waived the 
normal procurement controls and dealt with new, 
unknown – and sometimes untrustworthy – suppliers. 
This considerably reduced controls and possible 
detection of scams, while the considerable amount of 
money spent on these orders only added to the 
attraction for cybercriminals. As a side effect, travel and 
lockdown restrictions complicated face-to-face 
meetings between customers and suppliers (The 
Economist, 2020). Communication and agreements had 





to be done and negotiated online, with reduced 
safeguards to verify identities that made it easier for 
malicious actors to insert themselves into and exploit 
the process.   
Indeed, it offer a plausible explanation for some 
companies as to why payment details used during the 
pandemic differ from those on record for past 
transactions (Peterson, 2020). Faced with disruptions of 
global supply chains due to trade, workforce, and travel 
restrictions, competition for scarce resources put many 
companies under pressure to prove their financial 
commitment to their suppliers, resulting in less rigorous 
verification of invoices and payment requests (Peterson, 
2020). 
In addition, teleworking has dramatically 
increased the volume of professional emails, leading — 
as a side effect –  to “email/telework fatigue” and 
diminished attention to detail due to overload 
(Peterson, 2020). This can help explain the increased 
success rate of phishing, notably those using email as 
the attack vector (see section 2.2.4) (Lefferts, 2020). 
Additionally, this fatigue, coupled with the psychological 
and economic factors, has made business email 
compromise (BEC) particularly effective, notably when 
malicious actors use a coronavirus framing (for an in-
depth discussion of the use of BEC see section 2.2.6).  
 
Mobile Devices and Social Media 
 
Smartphones are now ubiquitous in most regions of the 
world. In many countries, they are even more prevalent 
than computers. Mobile devices play a central role in the 
way we socialize, inform, and entertain ourselves. This 
has been even more the case during this pandemic, 
where people have been separated from their friends, 
families and colleagues, and have been longing for both 
information and entertainment. As for telework, the 
pandemic has also altered or reinforced some user 
habits concerning mobile technologies – dynamics that 
played into and exacerbated threats.  
The pandemic has greatly increased this reliance 
and the time users have spent on their phones and other 
digital media. A growing body of literature supports this 
trend across a variety of populations. A study of 254 
Canadian families with young children reported an 
increase of screen time for mothers, fathers, and 
children during COVID-19 by 74 per cent, 61 per cent, 
and 87 per cent, respectively (Caroll et al., 2020). 
Moreover, a study conducted in China found that about 
70 per cent of 1033 participants spent more time looking 
at screens after the COVID-19 outbreak (Hu et al., 2020). 
Another study recruited 4108 participants from nine 
European countries and found a 65 per cent increase in 
                                                                
6 According to the latest report from DataReportal, there has been an 
important acceleration between the months of July and September 
2020 – illustrating a certain acceleration of the phenomenon that can 
be linked to habits developed during Covid-19 lockdowns (2020). 
screen time among the participants during this 
pandemic (Pišot et al., 2020).  
Linked to this general trend, one finds a corollary 
– albeit not direct –  increase in the reliance on and 
usage of social media – with a particular emphasis on 
video-based, gaming and live-streaming apps and 
features. More generally, the number of social media 
users has grown by more than 12 per cent compared to 
last year – slightly over the 9 per cent trend of 2018 and 
2019 – taking the global total to approximately 3.96 
billion by the start of July, according to digital reporting 
company DataReportal6  (Kemp, 2020). More 
specifically, while there is a general trend toward 
increased usage, it varies across countries and has been 
driven by other factors not related to the coronavirus, 
such as for instance the US elections. For instance, in the 
US, the Harris Poll reported that in March and May, 
between 46 to 51 per cent of American adults were 
using social media more frequently than before the 
outbreak (Samet, 2020). In Switzerland, by contrast, 
social media use has intensified for only around a 
quarter of the surveyed population7 according to a 
survey run by researchers at the University of Zurich 
(Hargittai and Nguyen, 2020).   
Despite the various measures taken by social 
media companies, the increased engagement on these 
platforms has played a key role in the nefarious 
development and spread of mis- and disinformation 
related to the pandemic (see next subsection for more 
details on the “infodemic”) – a dynamic that has played 
into the climate of fear and uncertainty exploited by 
malicious actors. This is particularly illustrated and 
spurred on by the fact that a considerable number of 
people now read and share their news on social media. 
While there is no definitive number worldwide, in 
Switzerland, over 70 per cent of the individuals surveyed 
obtained information on the coronavirus through one of 
the main social media platforms (i.e. WhatsApp, 
Facebook, Instagram, twitter and YouTube) (Hargittai 
and Nguyen, 2020).   
Apart from the public health concerns linked to 
the rising screen time (e.g. for mental health and lack of 
physical activity), the main concern from a cybersecurity 
perspective is that of an increased exposure to malicious 
material, be it disinformation or malware, coupled with 
a renewed interest from malicious actors to exploit the 
situation. Indeed, contrary to computers and IT 
networks, mobile cybersecurity hygiene is less mature 
and less well-integrated into people’s minds. These 
“pocket-sized computers” also suffer from less 
institutionalized protection and available cybersecurity 
solutions while collecting and storing a trove of sensitive 
7 The survey was conducted in mid-April. It involved 1,350 individuals 
across the 26 cantons. 





personal and financial data (Dawson et al., 2016; 
Kaspersky, 2020; Winder, 2019).  
Over the last few years, cyber threat actors have 
wasted no time and efforts exploiting the attack surface 
offered by smartphones and have continued to do so 
throughout the pandemic. Examples of such cases 
include the different malicious apps that were 
developed to capitalize on the increased information 
demand and change in working behaviors (e.g. fake 
COVID-19 tracking map or contact-tracing apps, 
malicious apps posing as Zoom variants, fake symptoms 
check app). Among the most common threats, we find 
banking Trojans, scams, and ransomware (see section 
2.2.2). 
*** 
The resulting combination of an increased attack 
surface coupled with a reduction in IT defenses and 
oversight capabilities has resulted in an overall increase 
in the risk of becoming a target of cybercrime, 
cyberespionage, and cyber-enabled disruption (Fidler, 
2020). Cyber threat actors have readily identified these 
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities and have targeted the 
most popular services and devices for telework: email, 
texting/SMS, video calls, conference calls, VPNs, and 
home networks (Intsights, 2020). As shown in the 
following sections, threat actors have also adapted their 
attacks to the new environment. Fear, need for 
information, and curiosity have been particularly 
targeted at the level of individual users. At the company 
level, time constraints and financial pressure have been 
among the key factors malicious actors have sought to 
leverage in their favor. 
1.1.2 Psychological and Informational Factors: Fear 
and Uncertainty Spurred Demand for 
Information 
 
The second factor that influenced the coronavirus-
related cyber threat landscape has been the 
psychological impact of the pandemic. The crisis has 
fostered an environment characterized by widespread 
anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty, and fear (Peterson, 
2020). An environment that all types of cyber threat 
actors have opportunistically and creatively exploited, 
whether in their scams, fraud, and extortion (see section 
2.2.3), phishing and social engineering (see section 
2.2.4), fake coronavirus-related apps (see section 2.2.2), 
spam attacks (see 2.2.7) or business email compromise 
(see section 2.2.6).   
Interestingly, reports – notably from the 
technology firm Microsoft –  have indicated a spike in 
the success of such attacks, especially for social 
engineering (Lefferts, 2020). This success/trend can be 
explained by the fact that when someone’s health is 
                                                                
8 Understood as an excessive amount of information about a problem 
that is typically unreliable, spreads rapidly, and makes a solution more 
difficult to achieve (Oxford Dictionary, n/a). 
involved, the need for information or curiosity can be 
easily aroused – and thus abused (Mouton & de Coning, 
2020). Moreover, strong emotions can often take 
precedent over suspicion and beat critical thinking, 
leading users to blindly follow instructions, especially 
when coming from seemingly credible and recognizable 
sources (SingCERT, 2020). This last element has been 
particularly prevalent and key as official 
communications from governments, schools, or 
employers were expected by individuals. Knowing so, 
threat actors have readily and craftily imitated such 
sources to conduct their schemes.  
In addition to spoofing, social engineering and 
phishing attacks have sought to leverage hoaxes and 
conspiracy theories or mixed fabricated with authentic 
information to arouse interest. As a result, purposely or 
opportunistically, cyber threat actors have contributed 
and reinforced the environment of anxiety as well as the 
“infodemic”8 that has plagued the coronavirus response. 
This dynamic has also been a central accelerating factor 
for the number and success of these cyberattacks 
(CyberPeace Institute, 2020). 
The intensified need for information by 
policymakers, companies, and individuals at the center 
of this “infodemic” has been coupled with a relative 
uncertainty of the information and data available; a 
discrepancy that allowed threat actors to thrive by 
presenting and playing different narratives and facts off 
against each other. Policymakers, in particular, were in 
need of reliable data to devise effective public health 
and economic responses. Many, however,  have 
operated with inadequate information – most notably 
linked to the medical and scientific uncertainty around 
the virus (Canadian Center for Cybersecurity, 2020). This 
dynamic was reinforced by the relatively limited time to 
consume information coupled with the scarcity of 
reliable data. The relative abundance of information 
sources and information channels on the other hand has 
complicated the sourcing and potentially the verification 
of certain claims and data points.  
The “infodemic” and climate of fear is not only 
linked to uncertain data and inadvertent misinformation 
but also targeted and mass-scale deliberate 
disinformation. Malicious actors – notably those backed 
by states – have leveraged this need for specific 
information to advance some of their strategic aims (see 
section 2.1). These ambitions include advancing specific 
narratives or sawing conflict, disruption, division, and 
dissent around the pandemic and its response (Intsights, 
2020). Examples include the disinformation campaign 
around martial law being declared in the US and the UK 
and fabricated speculation about the virus originating 
from the US (Associated Press, 2020).  





Lastly, the need for intelligence – notably on the 
spread of the disease, its impact on state rivals, and 
vaccine research – has also driven intrusion campaigns 
against medical organizations and research facilities by 
criminal and state-sponsored actors (see section 2.1). 
These actors have readily exploited the existing – and 
well-documented – socio-technical vulnerabilities in this 
sector but also the exacerbated time and resource 
pressure under which these institutions had to function 
during the pandemic.  
1.1.3 Economic and Logistical Factors: Economic 
Uncertainty, Availability of Grayware and High 
Demand for Certain Goods Enabled 
Cybercrime 
 
The third set of factors relates to different economic 
dynamics, namely those unfolding on financial markets 
and on grayware/malware markets, as well as the 
disruptions to trade and the global flow of goods.  
The pandemic has already led to a global economic 
downturn, leading to a rise in unemployment and a 
subsequent increase in poverty, economic uncertainty 
and distress. In the US, for instance, unemployment has 
risen to 13 per cent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020), 
while in OECD countries rates increased to 
approximately 8.3 per cent for Q2 2020 (OECD, 2020). A 
network of factors including the loss of revenue, an 
increase in available time, and a decrease in mobility has 
led to a rise in the number of actors engaged in 
cybercrime as a source of income.  
Governmental responses to income uncertainty, by 
way of distributed and massive financial aid and 
economic stimulus packages – e.g. two trillion USD in the 
US and 750 billion EUR in the EU – have also attracted a 
number of cyber threat actors. The form in which some 
of these funds have been dispersed  – e.g. as risk-free 
loans managed by banks and other financial institutions 
– only added to the risk profile of these institutions and 
the pressure of expectations for providing quick relief 
they experienced (Najarian, 2020). 
Moreover, market volatility and interest rate cuts 
have also been creating conditions and an environment 
that can be leveraged by fraudsters and scammers. With 
investment markets plunging in the first half of 2020, 
and certain central banks cutting the base rate (e.g. Bank 
of England or the US Federal Reserve), pension and 
investment customers and savers have been tempted to 
withdraw or transfer money from their plans to stanch 
short-term losses or generate some income. 
Cybercriminals have readily exploited concerns about 
the security of savings, investments, and pensions by 
luring victims into fake early access to pension funds or 
investment scams (Zurich, 2020).  
In addition to income and financial uncertainty, the 
inadvertent disruption to trade, logistics, and 
production  caused by restrictions that were put in place 
to mitigate the spread of the virus have also fostered a 
high demand for certain goods, including both 
specialized equipment (e.g. protective gear) and every-
day items (e.g. toilet paper). This demand, in turn, has 
created new opportunities for abuse by cyber threat 
actors, be it for goods-based scams, phishing, or 
malspam (see section 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.7). 
These logistical elements are rooted in several 
developments and dynamics. Disrupted production and 
trade lines contributed to shortages or limited 
availability of certain products, notably protective gear. 
Such sought-after products have been a common 
subject of scams. The shortages in protective gear were 
accentuated first and foremost by limited international 
production capacity and willingness to export any stocks 
that followed Chinese efforts to buy up global supplies 
in the early stages of the pandemic. In January and 
February, Chinese exports of these goods contracted 
about 15 per cent while its imports were about 47 per 
cent of global production. China’s exports gradually 
increased in later months – recording a 338 per cent 
increase by April – facilitating supply of protective gear 
to the most affected countries (UNCTAD, 2020). 
The spread of mis- and disinformation around the 
pandemic, coupled with a climate of anxiety, has also 
been a key factor contributing to the scarcity of certain 
products. Panic and opportunism has fueled bulk buying 
and price gouging. In addition, the closure of national 
borders and subsequent tight control and confiscation 
of “critical medical assets” intended for export – 
including protective gear or test kit components – 
further heightened concerns about shortages and the 
urgency to secure supplies, including through 
unconventional channels.   
In parallel, this growth in the number of 
cybercriminals has been supported and enhanced by the 
accessibility provided by flourishing underground 
markets and platforms for cybercrime tools (e.g. 
phishing templates or ready-to-run malware) and 
cybercrime-as-a-service. Indeed, the emergence of the 
grayware market and the increased commercialization 
of keyloggers, stealers, and Remote Access Trojans 
(RATs) has only magnified the various threats by 
reducing the barrier to entry for attackers, even those 
with limited programming skills or computer science 
expertise (Brumaghin and Unterbrink, 2020; Interpol, 
2020a). 
Anecdotally, analysts from the threat intelligence 
firm iDefense reported in April a significant increase in 
the sale of the popular Android banking Trojan Cerberus 
on criminal underground forums (e.g. XSS, Exploit and 
Club2crd (iDefense, 2020). Notably, the premier seller of 
the malware claimed to have sold more in one week 
than in the previous four months combined (iDefense, 
2020). 





1.2 Changes in Adversarial Behavior: 
Adaptation of Modus Operandi and 
Targeting 
 
Cyber threat actors have utilized the pandemic in a 
myriad of ways. Many reports and observers have 
described or portrayed these threats as unprecedented. 
While the extent to which these threats are 
unprecedented warrants a critical assessment (see 
section 1.3), it would be reductive to argue that the 
behavior of cyber adversaries has not been affected by 
the pandemic. Accordingly, the following paragraphs 
highlight four of these key changes.    
1.2.1 Cybercrime Business Model 
 
The first change has revolved around the 
business models of many cybercriminals. Indeed, 
underground and Darkweb hacking forums and 
grayware markets have reacted and adapted at a 
greater scale and speed than usual. Early on, many of 
these platforms adapted their offers and tailored them 
specifically for coronavirus-themed attacks  (Europol, 
2020a; Intsights, 2020). For instance, scams and phishing 
templates (e.g. for specific governments or the World 
Health Organization (WHO) have proliferated, adapting 
to the new demands and consumer habits brought on by 
the pandemic (e.g. in masks, toilet paper, ventilators, 
and thermometers) (Trend Micro, 2020a).  
Furthermore, while many cybercriminals seem to 
have thrived, the outbreak has also acted as a double-
edged sword for many others, who saw their business 
models collapse (Afifi-Sabet, 2020). Reports have shown 
that many cybercriminals have expressed their worry 
and desperation as to how the pandemic had affected 
their established business models. As a result, many 
have urgently tried to adapt their activities to the 
changed landscape (Afifi-Sabet, 2020; Guirakhoo, 
2020a). Mirroring offline life effects of the pandemic, 
some of the most affected malicious actors were the 
ones that specialized in various aspect of work life such 
as travel or events severely constrained by the 
pandemic. These saw their revenues dry up nearly 
overnight as lockdown measures were imposed across 
the world (Afifi-Sabet, 2020).  
Related to this, cybercriminals engaged in bank 
fraud, cashing out and warehouse/bank drops9 saw their 
activities considerably slowed down and disrupted for 
the same reasons (Photon Research Team, 2020). The 
daily activities of money mules have been disrupted in a 
number of countries – e.g. Spain, Italy – as they were 
afraid or unable to leave their homes (Intel471, 2020). 
                                                                
9 This term refers to the individuals employed to visit banks to 
withdraw money from fraudulently acquired accounts, allowing 
cybercriminals to “cash out” their illicitly earned funds. 
Reshipping mules, which usually pick up diverted goods 
in hotel lobbies or shops to stay anonymous, also saw 
their operation disrupted because of the social 
distancing norms in addition to the increasing wait time 
when calling FedEx, UPS or banks in general (Krebs, 
2020a). In addition, Amazon and other global providers 
blocked shipments of non-essential and often more 
expensive products, thus considerably limiting the range 
of available goods for such scams.  
 The pandemic has paved the road for wayward 
attempts at self-styled charity in the world of 
cybercrime. Several cybercrime vendors have launched 
promotion and marketing campaigns for their hacking 
services or malicious tools offering special “COVID-19” 
discounts and giveaways, allegedly to support 
“financially struggling” customers. One example 
includes Brian’s Club — one of the underground’s largest 
bazaars that sells stolen credit card data — which began 
offering “pandemic support” in the form of discounts for 
its most loyal customers (Krebs, 2020a). While 
giveaways, free advice, and donations have been part of 
the underground scene for a while, the offers related to 
coronavirus exploits and the appeal to the emotional 
and financial distress in order to attract new customers, 
such as amateur cybercriminals, is new. One of the main 
motivations behind these offers and discounts is the bid 
by these vendors to increase their reputation and 
credibility (Photon Research team, 2020).  
*** 
These changes illustrate the inherent dynamic 
and adaptability of threat actors. While the 
abovementioned specific cybercrime models were 
highly disrupted during the first six months of the 
pandemic – and continue to be so in many regions – they 
are nonetheless expected to return in some form or 
other once economic life in affected sectors recovers. In 
the meantime, other types of threats were created to 
leverage the pandemic in each of its different phases. 
This dynamic will only continue and the threats will only 
proliferate. The knowledge, technical gains and 
innovation achieved during the pandemic, however, will 
continue to show their effects in the years to come.  
1.2.2 Scale, Sophistication, and Modus Operandi of 
Cyberattacks 
 
The second change observed has been a shift in the scale 
of some types of attacks, the nature/sophistication of 
cyberattacks, and the modus operandi of different 
threat actors.  
Among these, one pre-eminent change has been in 
the scale10 of some campaigns, most notably 
10 As a caveat and premise to section 1.3; despite the increase in 
scale of phishing attacks, the general scale and volume of malware 
and cyberattacks has remained consistent over time (Microsoft, 
2020). 





coronavirus-themed phishing attempts. This increase in 
scale can be explained by the aforementioned set of 
psycho-informational factors and the opportunistic and 
geopolitical logic inherent to the different malicious 
actors. This willingness of grasping the opportunity 
presented by the pandemic is apparent in efforts during 
the early months of the pandemic, when cybercriminals 
actively recruited collaborators – e.g. amateurs or 
former money mules – to orchestrate these large-scale 
phishing campaigns and maximize the impact of their 
attacks (Europol, 2020a).  
Another observation is that the complexity and 
sophistication of the attacks have evolved compared to 
the previous year and as the pandemic progressed and 
hit different parts of the world. For instance, the initial 
phishing and malware attacks in the early months of the 
year – before the pandemic reached Europe – were 
relatively simple. However, they grew in sophistication, 
with better coordination and improved lures (i.e. 
templates, websites, etc.) as they began to target 
increasingly more complex organizations (e.g. 
governments, or hospitals). In addition, Microsoft posits 
that attackers, particularly state-sponsored ones, have 
also become more sophisticated in performing 
reconnaissance on high-value targets, reflected in 
considerations of factors like public holidays that might 
reduce the victim organization’s ability of responding in 
real-time, or otherwise hardening their networks (Burt, 
2020). Criminals, meanwhile, are also now following 
even more holistic strategies by notably employing and 
exploiting a greater variety of tools, systems, and 
vulnerabilities, including by assuming false identities 
and through close cooperating with other groups 
(Europol, 2020b). 
Another change pertains to the modus operandi 
associated with certain types of cyberattacks; some of 
which have changed while certain cyberattacks have 
been preferred to others. For instance, cyberattacks 
such as reshipping attacks or scams involving non-
essentials products have seen far less windfall profits 
from the pandemic compared to other criminal activity 
due to operational difficulties. By contrast, credential 
stealing via phishing attacks and ransomware have 
become among the most prevalent types of attacks, 
greatly benefiting from the socio-technical 
vulnerabilities fostered by the pandemic. According to 
Microsoft, many cybercriminals have readily leveraged 
the pandemic context and shifted their focus to phishing 
attacks – amounting to approximately 70 per cent of the 
attacks observed – as a more direct means to achieve 
their goal of harvesting credentials (Microsoft, 2020). As 
illustrated in section 2.2.4, attackers have often sent 
emails imitating top brands (e.g. Zoom, Microsoft, UPS, 
Amazon, and Apple among others) and official 
organizations (e.g. CDCs, health agencies, or tax and 
revenues agencies). 
In combination with the opportunistic and profit-
maximizing logic that underlines these attacks, 
cybercriminals have tweaked their attack methods, 
notably for ransomware. According to Europol and 
Microsoft, cybercriminals have shortened the period 
between the initial infection and the activation of the 
ransomware attack, thus not waiting for an ideal 
moment to launch the attack but trying as soon as 
possible to cash in (Europol, 2020c; Muncaster, 2020a). 
In some instances, cyber-criminals went from initial 
entry to holding an organization’s entire network for 
ransom in under 45 minutes. Furthermore, since the 
beginning of the pandemic, malicious actors seem to 
have widely adopted a new form of ransomware attacks 
for double extortion. In this scenario, the attackers 
exfiltrate large quantities of data prior to encrypting it. 
Victims who refuse to pay the ransom are threatened 
with the data being leaked or sold on the black market, 
putting additional pressure on them to meet the 
criminals’ demands (Check Point Software Technologies, 
2020a; MELANI, 2020). In addition to the Maze 
ransomware, Sodinokibi/REvil, DoppelPaymer, 
Mespinoza/PYSA, NetWalker, CLoP, RagnarLock, and 
Nefilim have also been observed using this technique 
(Coveware, 2020). 
Malicious actors have also taken advantage of 
people spending more time at home and the related 
increase in online activity (i.e. online shopping) to 
engage in online carding activities. Due to the increased 
amount of online banking transactions – e.g. in March 
online operations made up more than 50 per cent of 
banking transaction compared to the usual 33 per cent 
– carding fraud has become more difficult to attribute 
and to detect (Photon Research Team, 2020).  
Another evolution has been around mobile 
threats. Throughout the early months of 2020, threat 
actors have been seeking new infection vectors in the 
mobile world, changing and improving their techniques 
to avoid detection in places such as the official 
application stores. In one innovative attack, threat 
actors used a large international corporation’s mobile 
device management system to distribute malware to 
more than 75 per cent of its managed mobile devices 
(Check Point Software Technologies, 2020a). 
1.2.3 Targets 
 
is the pandemic has shaped a distinct pattern of the 
geographical distribution of cyberattacks, as well as for 
the way and intensity with which some victims have 
been targeted by malicious actors.  
Unsurprisingly, cyberattacks during the 
coronavirus pandemic have followed a logic of 
opportunism and have intensively targeted countries 
that were the most affected by the virus. Reports in 
March and April, for instance, highlighted spikes in 
coronavirus-related cyberattacks in Italy, Spain, France, 
India, the UK, the US, and Canada (Arsene, 2020a; F and 





Scholten, 2020). Meanwhile, states such as China and 
Japan that were affected earlier in the year also suffered 
coronavirus-related cyberattacks ahead of other 
countries.  
In terms of targets, one major change during 
these first two quarters of 2020 has been the relatively 
novel and intense targeting of the healthcare sector 
(alongside the education sector) for both profit and 
espionage.11 Attacks against the healthcare sector as 
such are far from new and have been relatively easy and 
common as healthcare providers are acutely vulnerable 
not only to social engineering schemes but also to 
relatively unsophisticated attacks (e.g. RDP brute force) 
because of the use of unsupported operating systems or 
misconfigured web servers (Microsoft Threat Protection 
Intelligence Team, 2020; Schneier and Bourdeaux, 
2020). In the past years, there has been a considerable 
number of – direct and indirect – ransomware attacks 
against such organizations. From mid-2018 to mid-2019, 
Recorded Future catalogued 134 publicly reported 
ransomware attacks against healthcare providers in the 
US (Liska, 2020a).  
The novelty here is the increased criticality of 
these organizations and the stress under which they 
operate due to the pandemic. These factors, 
compounded by the often inadequate cybersecurity 
resources and the opportunist and strategic logic of 
some malicious actors, has led to an increase in intensity 
and systematization of attacks against them (see section 
2.2.8). Just to illustrate, the WHO saw a 500 per cent 
increase in cyberattacks against its systems (WHO, 
2020a).  
As such, the targeting of the healthcare sector is 
part of a greater trend identified by Interpol where 
malicious actors, particularly cybercriminals, driven by a 
profit-maximizing logic, have shifted from individuals 
and small businesses to major corporations, 
governments and critical infrastructure – including 
major IT companies and financial providers such as 
Cognizant or Finastra (Interpol, 2020b). The 
substantiveness of this assessed shift is difficult to fully 
verify, but the increase in exploitation of remote-
working tools and infrastructure could be a hint in that 
direction. In addition, disruptive and information-
stealing malware attacks seem to have focused on larger 
organizations due to the higher potential rewards. 
Nonetheless, individuals and small businesses that 
mostly operate online remained, at least in the early 
stages of the pandemic, an important target group 
(Krebs, 2020a).  
                                                                
11 In the later quarters, this trend seems to have diminished but is 
expected to rise again with new waves of infections.   
12 More specifically, this statistic refers to the number of monthly 
users in Italy organizing online meetings and coals through Microsoft 
Teams. Italy had rigorous social distancing or shelter in place orders 
in force during that period. 
Another important trend relates to cloud-based 
services and teleworking infrastructure and data, which 
have also been increasingly targeted – as companies, 
schools, and governments moved online, which at the 
same time facilitated their exploitation by threat actors.  
Microsoft shared that in some regions the growth in its 
cloud service increased by as much as 775 per cent 
during March,12 a  rise that has since normalized 
(Microsoft Azure, 2020). Usage of cloud services has 
increased by approximately 50 per cent compared to 
January, with manufacturing and financial services 
leading the way, whereas online video conferencing 
services specifically saw an increase in usage of up to 
600 per cent compared to the beginning of the year, 
mostly driven by the education, governmental, and 
financial sectors (McAfee, 2020a).  
Concurrently, McAfee saw the number of 
external cyberattacks13 against these infrastructure and 
services – particularly exploiting Office365 – increase by 
630 per cent between January and April 2020 (McAfee, 
2020a).14 Accordingly, malicious actors have readily 
exploited  and attacked cloud infrastructure 
vulnerabilities (e.g. one critical vulnerability in Microsoft 
Azure discovered in January), cloud service providers 
drawing on misconfigurations and user errors (Check 
Point Software Technologies, 2020b).  
On top of that, threat actors are also using cloud 
infrastructure to their advantage and have increasingly 
started to store and disguise the malicious payloads 
used for their malware attacks in the cloud (Check Point 
Software Technologies, 2020b). Threat actors have 
disguised and stored malicious payloads on GitHub, 
Gmail or Alibaba to deliver commands or host 
configuration files. In other cases, just uploading 
seemingly benign documents with malicious links to 
Google Drive can give them the extra touch of legitimacy 
needed to trick unsuspecting victims. Cloud services are 
aware of these activities, but threat actors are adapting 
with encryption and camouflage techniques, offering 
droppers dedicated to placing malware on the cloud 
(Check Point Software Technologies, 2020b). 
1.2.4 Motivation of State-Sponsored Actors  
 
A last change has been the motivations and objectives 
of many state-related threat actors. During these first six 
months of 2020, the objectives of these malicious actors 
seem to have largely been framed by one theme, namely 
the pandemic and its response. This has translated into 
organized, and coordinated efforts towards intelligence 
collection and espionage on vaccine and treatment 
13 Indicated either by excessive usage from new locations or 
suspicious behavior that deviates from patters observed for human 
users.  
14 In February, the rate of cloud attacks was higher than the increase 
in adoption of cloud services. Between March and April, however, the 
two seem to have evolved linearly (McAfee, 2020a). 





research and other types of strategic data related to the 
pandemic (e.g. infection rates).  This also includes 
information regarding the coronavirus pandemic’s 
effect on military preparedness. These espionage 
dynamics have not only been driven by but have also 
fostered increasing international tension and 
competition, both between adversaries and like-minded 
states.   
Such information is of critical strategic value for 
all affected states as it would provide key strategic 
health, economic, and political benefits for fighting the 
pandemic, returning to “normalcy” and limit the 
economic ravage that prolonged lockdowns, social-
distancing measures, and the looming recession have 
brought. In addition, vaccine espionage is undertaken in 
a climate of geopolitical rivalries underlined with fears 
that even following the discovery and approval of 
vaccines, their availability and distribution might be tied 
to political or economic conditions. These concerns 
remain despite the tentative reassurances made by 
most states to make the vaccine a global public good.  
Consequently, and as mentioned above, 
institutions and organizations of the healthcare sector, 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, 
government agencies monitoring these sectors as well 
as operators of logistic infrastructure involved in the 
distribution are moving into the crosshairs of 
intelligence services and APTs (Wiggen, 2020). An 
overview of the different cases reported is provided in 
section 2.1.2, but the general trend indicates a “free for 
all” where threat actors from across the world compete 
against one another for this intelligence, many of whom 
are using COVID-19 lures as this theme has proven to be 
a virtual opener for exploitation.  
As a result, western national (cyber-)security 
bodies, such as NATO, the UK National Cyber Security 
Centre (NCSC), the Canadian Communication Security 
Establishment (CSE), or the US Cybersecurity 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and National 
Security Agency (NSA), and political leaders, such as the 
European Commission President von der Leyen, have 
explicitly warned of and linked some of these 
cyberattacks to Russian (i.e. APT29) and Chinese threat 
actors (National Cyber Security Centre, 2020a, 2020b; 
Stolton, 2020). Reports by the cybersecurity industry 
have corroborated such claims. These views are, 
however, far from representative, considering business-
driven incentives to highlight risks and to focus on 
threats to well-paying customers. Most of the English-
language public reporting by the cybersecurity industry 
is produced by western companies and may reflect a 
collection bias against US adversaries given the 
companies’ customer base. Due to high-profile strategic 
interests at stake, it is highly likely that western states 
also engage in similar actions.  
Notably, cyber-enabled industrial espionage 
against research institutions and healthcare is far from 
new. Both China and Iran have been known for hacking 
and exfiltrating intellectual property in order to catch 
up, retain or develop a strategic advantage in specific 
issue area (targeting, among others,  military 
organizations, nuclear research, or the tech industry). 
Accordingly, it is these past experiences and the 
development of the necessary capabilities and 
infrastructure for these targeted attacks that help 
explain, in part, the prevalence and volume of these 
attacks, particularly by China and Iran. 
As mentioned, these expanded motivations and 
attack dynamics have been fostered, in part, by the 
rising international tensions, particularly in the relations 
between the US and China but also between China and 
Australia. The Sino-American relationship, already tense 
since the trade war and the competition for 5G, has only 
deteriorated further as the pandemic developed. Causes 
include disinformation and propaganda on both sides, 
overt racism from the Trump administration, the 
removal of Hong Kong’s special policy status, the mutual 
accusation of cooptation of the WHO, and the 
indictment of Chinese cybercriminals/spies. As a result, 
the increase in geopolitical competition and 
deteriorating dialogue between the United States and 
China will likely encourage higher profile attacks on 
telecommunications, technology, and finance firms, and 
critical infrastructure industry verticals in the US and 
allied countries (Clark, 2020). 
This dynamic played into other crucial drivers, 
such as the demand for medical intelligence, particularly 
in a context where  official data may not always be 
transparent or trustworthy. Indeed, the publicly 
released data of many states and bodies, such as Iran, 
China, the WHO and now the US have been heavily 
questioned. Many states have been accused of lying or 
not fully disclosing the full range of the spread of 
infections and the concomitant threat to public health. 
This dynamic was and is particularly reinforced in 
countries where the press is not free and where 
censorship on the issue took place.   
Another contributing factor are the lockdowns, 
the limitation on international flights, and social-
distancing norms, which, all together, have considerably 
restricted traditional intelligence collection activities 
and thus favored the use of cyber tools to carry out 
strategic espionage and reconnaissance (Check Point 
Software Technologies, 2020b). As a result, cyber 
intelligence has become the instrument of choice of 
many countries with the associated capabilities, 
particularly as the risk calculus is so favorable to the 
attackers – i.e. perceptions of a low risk of escalation but 
high potential reward.  
Due to the urgencies wrought by the pandemic, 
previous grievances or strategic interests have become 
less salient and apparently receded into the background 
as media attention on the pandemic crowded-out many 
of these issues. Despite the lack of media attention, they 
have not disappeared, as proven by the various ongoing 
sophisticated cyber campaigns that show no immediate 





nexus with the pandemic. This realization underpins 
several open-ended questions. The first being how and 
to what extent has the change in focus affected other 
types or ongoing cyber operations? Related to that, to 
what extent are some malicious actors able to continue 
such activities in light of the impending economic or 
budgetary pressure? Pertaining to the last one, one 
supposition is that these programs attempted to 
supplement dwindling state revenues through 
cybercrime. 
1.3 Relative Continuity in Adversarial 
Behavior  
 
As the last sections have shown, the coronavirus 
pandemic has brought unprecedented change to the 
physical and digital worlds. It has fostered some socio-
technical changes and an acceleration of digitalization 
that will have lasting effects in the months – and years – 
to come; effects that will affect the cyber threat 
landscape as malicious actors exploit these new 
avenues.  
Despite what could at first appear as 
fundamental changes in the cyber threat landscape and 
adversarial behavior, a number of its elements have 
remained relatively unchanged 5despite the crisis 
environment. This notably includes the type of active 
actors(see section 2.1), the type of malware and 
techniques deployed (see section 2.2.), and the overall 
volume of certain types of attacks (e.g. phishing and 
malspam). Accordingly, the threat landscape that has 
emerged during the pandemic is shaped by a number of 
pre-existing conditions. 
The first similarity to threat assessments from 
before the pandemic to underline is that cyber threats 
are by nature inherently dynamic, fluid, and reactive. 
Indeed, threat actors tend to continuously innovate to 
find new ways to avoid detection, to attain their 
objectives, or to exploit some new avenues and 
opportunities. As a result, they adapt their social 
engineering schemes, cybercrime services, and malware 
to current events (e.g. to take advantage of elections to 
military clashes) to ensure their success. This has 
particularly been the case in time of crises, which often 
provide additional opportunities for exploits and 
catalyze malicious efforts beyond the baseline usually 
observed (see section 1.1). Themes, attacks, and 
business models come and go and, depending on the 
issue, are sometimes adapted and reused. This was also 
the case for many coronavirus-related cyberattacks, 
which were in many cases former Ebola-themed attacks 
with a simple word switch (Cimpanu, 2020b; Mouton 
and de Coning, 2020). Threat actors have also been fluid 
and adaptive throughout the different phases of the 
                                                                
15 While these percentages need to be nuanced and put into 
perspective, they still illustrate a trend towards a low volume of 
pandemic across the globe, exploiting, turn after turn, 
any attention-worthy events – e.g. lockdowns, 
transitions, reopenings, financial aid, unemployment, 
medical leave, etc. This opportunism and dynamism 
have not faltered, meaning threat actors will continue to 
leverage any newsworthy developments around the 
pandemic (e.g. new lockdown, second wave, etc.).   
The second similarity is that the cyber threat 
actors active during this pandemic are essentially the 
same as before the crisis, although they slightly modified 
their operations and business model to best exploit the 
crisis (Europol, 2020c). For instance, most of the active 
APTs observed during this pandemic have been in 
operation since before the pandemic – some of which 
have been pursuing a variety of geostrategic goals 
unrelated to the pandemic (Europol, 2020c). There has 
been, however, a slight increase in the number of 
amateur cybercriminals (i.e. linked to opportunity and 
financial pressure), whose attacks mostly fall on the 
lower end of the spectrum and were accounted for in 
the early spikes in phishing attacks. Other established 
actors, meanwhile, largely pursue the same objectives, 
be it financial or strategic. And while it is true that 
medical espionage did take priority during these first 
months of the pandemic, it is primarily a new and time-
bound facet of the ongoing greater strategic game 
between nations states.  
The third similarity relates to the techniques, 
infrastructure and malware used by these same actors. 
Apart from some exceptions, such as the resurgence of 
Zeus and double-extortion ransomware, the techniques 
and malware that are deployed are largely the same as 
before the crisis, only repurposed from former 
campaigns (e.g. Emotet, Agent Tesla, Trickbot, Lokibot, 
and Formbook – see section 2.2.5)  (Joyce, 2020; 
Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, 2020). 
Furthermore, some threat actors have continued to 
exploit old and new vulnerabilities before they were 
patched.  As such, this lack of innovation can probably 
be linked to an inherent cost-benefit logic as long as 
existing tools retain – if not increase – their effectiveness 
in the current environment. 
Lastly, despite the large increase in percentages 
of coronavirus-related attacks, such cyberattacks only 
comprised a small amount of the overall threat volume 
(Lefferts, 2020; Muncaster, 2020b; nixu, 2020). In April, 
Microsoft wrote that of the millions of emails it sees and 
scans daily, only 60,000 included COVID-19-related 
malicious attachments or malicious URLs, which 
amounts to less than two per cent15 of the total 
malicious email (malspam) traffic. Instead of a spike in 
traffic, Microsoft said that cybercriminals have merely 
changed email templates and subject lines (lures), 
switching from regular invoice-themed lures to 
coronavirus-related topics (Cimpanu, 2020c; Lefferts, 
COVID-19-related cyber threats compared to the level of threats 
generally. 





2020). In addition, the Microsoft Threat Protection 
Intelligence Team later claimed that even the peak of 
coronavirus-related attacks in the first two weeks of 
March was “barely a blip in the total volume of threats 
we typically see in a month” (Microsoft Threat 
Protection Intelligence Team, 2020; Muncaster, 2020b).  
Furthermore, the general level of phishing 
emails, spam emails, malicious URLs, and malicious 
email attachments has remained similar to previous 
periods. Taking Kaspersky’s reporting for Q1 2020 for 
illustration, the largest share of spam was recorded in 
January (55.76 per cent) and the average percentage of 
spam in global mail traffic was 54.61 per cent, down 1.58 
percentage points compared to Q4 2019 (Shcherbakova 
et al., 2020). For the same reporting period, Kaspersky’s 
solution detected a total of 49 million malicious email 
attachments, which is almost identical to the figure for 
the last reporting period. Indeed, the absolute number 
of malicious attachments detected in Q1 2020 dropped 
by 314,000 compared to Q4 2019 (Shcherbakova et al., 
2020).16  
1.4 Takeaways for the Future  
 
Looking at both, the novelty due to the pandemic and 
the overarching continuity of the cybersecurity threat 
landscape as such, there are a number of takeaways and 
considerations that seem to be relevant for the future, 
particularly as many countries brace themselves for a 
second wave of infections and a possible lockdown. 
One first takeaway is that the volume and damage 
done by cybercrime have been steadily increasing over 
the past years and that the coronavirus pandemic will 
only reinforce this trend, as the economic pressure will 
further incentivize individuals’ recourse to cybercrime as 
a means of income. These economic drivers will become 
more structural as the gains and knowledge acquired 
during this pandemic will encourage aspirant 
cybercriminals to continue.  
In practice, while the observed surge in online 
scams, phishing, and BEC related to the coronavirus has 
already somewhat stabilized and rescinded, it will not 
disappear. The general levels of cybercrime observed 
will probably remain higher than before the crisis 
(Interpol, 2020a). Meanwhile, as long as the coronavirus 
remains an ongoing issue, one can expect cybercriminals 
to leverage the theme. As we move forward in this crisis, 
one topic, in particular, that may catalyze the attention 
of the public and private sector – and thus offers new 
opportunities to cyber threat actors – will be the issue 
of vaccine development and distribution as well as any 
information pertaining to new waves of infections and 
renewed lockdowns.  
                                                                
16 As a caveat, other types of attacks, such as ransomware or brute 
force attacks, or attacks against the cloud, have indeed become more 
prevalent during this period (see section 1.2.2 and 2.2.5). 
Thus, as the cyber threats continue to grow and 
adapt, the importance of cybersecurity awareness-
raising, capacity building, and communication for all 
stakeholders needs to be underlined. Particular efforts 
should be made around authentication methods, such 
as the rigorous verification of credentials and 
deployment multifactor authentication. Indeed, one of 
the main increasing threats of this first half of 2020 has 
been identity-based attacks using brute force on 
enterprise accounts (e.g. for Zoom, VPNs, email 
accounts  etc.). This critical first step would considerably 
harden the cybersecurity of many institutions and 
complicate many – now automated – exploits. 
At the same time, responsible authorities (e.g. 
public and private CSIRTs) should especially capitalize on 
the attention the issue of cybersecurity has received in 
the last few months to promote and build upon the 
efforts, resources, and communication channels 
developed during this pandemic. These efforts should 
not be restricted to telework themes but broadened to 
the evolving threats posed by the digitization processes 
spurred by the pandemic. Initiatives such as the WHO’s 
CYB4COVID resources compendium and the ECSO’s 
Cyber Solidarity campaign are only two among a myriad 
of worthy examples that could serve as inspiration. 
Another important lesson learned concerns 
threat intelligence. This pandemic has highlighted the 
importance of information exchange, cooperation, and 
coordination between all stakeholders. The urgency of 
the cybersecurity situation – notably for healthcare 
organizations – has led to a renewed engagement, be it 
in the form of round tables with third parties, contact 
points, common reporting, or dedicated networks, and 
initiatives. As we move forward, all of these advances 
need to be consolidated and built upon, especially as 
these dynamics not only fostered a better 
understanding and more comprehensive view of the 
evolving cyber threat landscape but also supported 
coordinated response and communication, which are 
central to better preparedness. These steps have 
facilitated the identification – and sometimes 
remediation – of redundancies and bureaucratic hurdles 
(e.g. intelligence classification rules for third parties such 
as critical infrastructure) that have undermined 
information sharing in the past. Most importantly, this 
engagement has also helped tighten the 
cybersecurity/CSIRT community at large and fostered 
trust and personal contacts, two crucial components in 
times of crisis.  
However, a critical challenge for quality threat 
intelligence has been information overload. While public 
reporting by commercial cyber threat intelligence 
companies can be very useful – notably for advancing 
open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis – without 





appropriate contextualization it can create “intelligence 
noise” and biased/sensationalist reporting.  
Another finding is that policymakers and 
cybersecurity professionals should not underestimate 
the accelerating impact the coronavirus has had on the 
digitalization of our economies and societies, and the 
threats and vulnerabilities that have emerged as a 
result. Among these, the normalization of teleworking 
and use of cloud-based services stands out. As countries 
continue to experience different types of lockdowns and 
a resurgence of coronavirus cases, we are  experiencing 
a renewed increase of remote work. As such, the various 
risks and vulnerabilities described throughout this 
report will remain relevant – with new ones emerging. 
However, compared to the situation in the early months 
of 2020, companies and organizations should have had 
enough time – and if not, should start – to invest in 
infrastructure to support a sustainable and secure shift 
to telework. This includes, among others, investing time 
and money in corporate devices, identity and access 
control/management, awareness-raising programs for 
employees, contingency and internal reporting 
protocols/systems, and the recruitment of new talent. 
This also includes the shift toward more “new 
school”,i.e. automated, cybersecurity technologies and 
practices, such as pattern recognition and predictive 
analytics against malware or automated detection of 
abnormal network resource allocation against DDoS 
attacks. This shift to automation would allow for a more 
efficient allocation of a limited cybersecurity workforce.  
Furthermore, policymakers, product designers, 
and company leaders must also realize that a 
sustainable and secure shift toward telework is not 
possible without properly addressing cloud security – 
including some interlinked challenges such as 5G – and 
that of cloud-based applications/services. As mentioned 
in this report, widely popular cloud-based applications 
and services, such as Zoom or Microsoft Teams, have 
suffered from security vulnerabilities and the scrutiny of 
malicious actors due to their popularity. Furthermore, 
the rise in cloud-based applications and telework 
indicate a probable continuous increase in Internet 
traffic, with all that this entails in terms of criticality and 
vulnerability of ISPs, increasing intensity of DDoS 
attacks, and the general digital noise that make threat 
detection more complex.  
Meanwhile, SMEs and small actors that had to 
digitize hastily to survive economically remain, for the 
most part, immature in terms of cybersecurity and thus 
run the risk of being targets in the near future. Indeed, 
threat actors who had concentrated their efforts on 
larger – more profitable – unsecured organizations and 
infrastructure during the peak of the crisis – e.g. 
hospitals – will probably shift their focus towards the 
low-hanging fruits that are these less well-resourced 
actors.  As such, this calls for even more awareness and 
capacity buildings for these stakeholders. As they 
remain one of the hardest stakeholders to reach in 
terms of providing cost-effective cybersecurity, it seems 
essential to find new ways of getting to them, whether 
by tailored products, dedicated campaigns, events, or 
passive communication channels such as newsletters.  In 
addition, the shift towards a cashless and digital 
economy also means that more carding fraud is to be 
expected, particularly as detection of fraud becomes 
harder due – in part – to the increase in financial 
transactions as well as the quantity of new entry points 
in the global transaction system.  
The final consideration is that geopolitical 
competition and tensions are on the rise and will 
probably continue on this trajectory. This dynamic is 
particularly anchored in the efforts to find, and later 
distribute, a vaccine – which may include espionage on 
research, confiscation of essential supplies for the 
production of vaccines or the rerouting of actual 
vaccines, and disinformation about the effectiveness 
and safety of vaccines. As a result, policymakers should 
expect a constant – if not increasing –  level of 
sophisticated cyber threats against critical 
infrastructure, especially organizations involved in 
vaccine research and production, as well as 
disinformation around the issue. This is even more true 
as, fueled by countries willing to pursue vaccines at 
significant cost and the general international calendar 
(e.g. US elections), the window of opportunity for de-
escalation between great powers is narrowing – at least 
in the next few months.  
 Concerning healthcare, despite the absence of 
grave repercussion – apart from funds lost in ransom 
schemes and loss of strategic or economic advantage 
through espionage – the pandemic has highlighted the 
well-known cybersecurity deficiencies in the healthcare 
sector and provided a glimpse into how these 
cybersecurity risks could impact crisis responses. This 
wakeup call – or at least mobilization of political elites – 
should be leveraged not only to promote and invest in 
dedicated awareness-raising, updated systems, and 
capacity building (e.g. of the medical staff) but also 
rethink the general cybersecurity approaches for key 
critical infrastructure to build up their cyber-resilience. 
On top of the traditional top-down cybersecurity 
injunctions and support structures, the pandemic has 
offered us a glimpse of a promising form of bottom-up 
mobilization (e.g. the various cybersecurity community 
militias that helped defend the health sector) that 
should be built upon and further developed.  
Concerning disinformation, the development of 
new and the improvement of existing technologies (e.g.  
AI-powered text generations or the proliferation of 
deepfake capabilities) coupled with the noxious 
international and national climates tend to indicate that 
large-scale disinformation is generally here to stay. This 
is also true about mis- and disinformation around the 
coronavirus. Spurred by the pre-existing domestic 
divisions and mistrust and leveraged to create new ones, 
coronavirus-themed disinformation will remain 





prevalent, particularly as the subject will continue to 
permeate most public, political, economic, and private 
discussions.  
  





2 Cyber Threat Landscape: 




To better qualify and illustrate these developments and 
their implications, the following paragraphs provide a 
general snapshot analysis of the various cyber threats 
observed for the first half of 2020 – i.e. from January to 
the end of June 2020. The chosen focus and emphasis is 
on coronavirus/COVID-19-related cyberattacks and 
threats. To do so, the first subsection describes (2.1) the 
various active threat actors and their aims, such as 
cybercriminals and state sponsored threat actors. The 
second subsection (2.2) lays out a variety of the type of 
threats, from phishing and malware campaigns to BEC 
and DDoS. As a disclaimer, this subsection is based on 
traditional threat reporting categories. Finally, the last 
subsection (2.3) focuses on notable targets of these 
attacks and their geographical distribution. 
2.1 Actors and Aims 
 
Among the five types of threat actors generally 
recognized in threat intelligence reporting – namely 
cybercriminals, state-supported groups (or Advanced 
Persistent Threats (APTs)), script kiddies, insider threats, 
and hacktivists – cybercriminals and state sponsored 
actors have been the most active/visible in exploiting 
the ongoing health crisis. The others, while likely active, 
have seemingly posed less of a threat and are thus not 
covered in this report.  
2.1.1 Cybercriminals 
 
The first type of actor that has been considerably – if not 
the most – active during this pandemic are 
cybercriminals. In contrast to state-sponsored actors, 
their goal is predominantly financial. Only a small subset 
is engaged in sowing destruction, disruption, panic, or 
confusion. The outbreak has been leveraged by the 
whole spectrum of cybercriminals, from professional 
and well-established cybercrime groups to aspiring or 
opportunistic cybercriminals.  
At the lower end of the spectrum, the 
coronavirus crisis has attracted a number of amateur or 
aspiring cybercriminals – sometimes referred to as script 
kiddies turned bad – some of which were criminals (e.g. 
drug dealers) that saw their criminal livelihood 
threatened by the lockdowns. Most actors of this group 
possess limited programming knowledge and skills. 
These seem to have acted due to a confluence of factors, 
which are, to a certain degree, also valid for more 
sophisticated actors (Europol, 2020c). Described in more 
detail in section 1, these are: the high demand for paired 
with scarcity of certain goods; an increase in available 
time due to a reduction in individual mobility or 
workload (e.g. due to layoffs); and an increase in 
malicious tools available on underground forums. 
At the more advanced end of the spectrum, 
criminal actors have equally seized on uncertainty and 
fear related to the pandemic as an opportunity to trick 
users into unsafe behavior. Indeed, researchers and 
journalists have reported several campaigns by known 
cybercriminal organizations and groups. Anecdotally, 
this includes the Russian threat actor 505 (aka. TA505), 
which is known for their large campaigns, 
experimentation with a variety of malware delivery 
mechanisms, and distribution of ransomware, banking 
Trojans and RATs (Degrippo, 2020a; F & Scholten, 2020). 
In March, it was reported that they used coronavirus 
lures – including emails with the subject line “protect 
your friends” – to infect victims, primarily employees at 
US pharmaceutical and manufacturing companies, with 
an embedded Get2Loader and SDBbot RAT (F & 
Scholten, 2020). The same group has also been sending 
coronavirus-themed malspam to healthcare, 
manufacturing, and pharmaceutical organizations in the 
US. The emails have the subject "COVID-19 Everything 
you need to know" and contain a link to a ransomware 
downloader that can be used to further infect an 
accessing machine (Cyjax, 2020). A separate TA505 
campaign, targeting healthcare providers, requests a 
bitcoin payment, ostensibly to help develop "Remedies 
On Corona-Virus” (Cyjax, 2020; Degrippo, 2020a). 
Another malicious group, TA564, that regularly 
targets users in Canada by posing as shipping 
companies, such as CanadaPost and DHL, has attempted 
to deliver Ursnif, DanaBot, and Nymaim Trojans in the 
past (F & Scholten, 2020). Researchers at security firm 
Proofpoint have attributed an email campaign targeting 
“parents and guardians” while spoofing the Public 
Health Agency of Canada to deliver the Ursnif Trojan (F 
& Scholten, 2020). 
The Russian-speaking threat actor TA542 (aka 
Mummy spider) has also been reported to use 
coronavirus-related themes in various email distribution 
campaigns. Malicious documents distributed by the 
actor have embedded macros that act as a downloader 
for Emotet malware (Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence, 
2020). 
 Groups engaged in business email compromise 
have also been leveraging the crisis and deploying 
adapted coronavirus-oriented attacks (see section 
1.3.4). Among the known active groups are Silent 
Starling, Curious Orca and Ancient tortoise (Gatlan, 
2020). 
 The Nigerian cybercriminal organization 
Scattered Canary been behind the massive fraud against 
unemployment insurance programs in various US states, 
including Florida, Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming – 
with potential losses exceeding 100 million USD 
(Hassold, 2020; Krebs, 2020b). According to researchers 





from the cybersecurity firm Agari, evidence has also 
been found that links Scattered Canary to previous 
attacks targeting CARES Act Economic Impact Payments, 
which were meant to provide relief in response to the 
coronavirus pandemic, as well as new scams targeting 
Hawaiian unemployment benefits (Hassold, 2020). 
 Organized ransomware gangs have also 
leveraged the current pandemic and continue to present 
a significant threat to businesses in all sectors, 
particularly to healthcare organizations and other 
critical infrastructure operators across the board – e.g. 
targeting government facilities, education institutions, 
and within the energy and food industry. Groups 
including Maze, Doppelpaymer, Sodinikobi/REvil, 
Pwndlocker, Ako and Nefilim have used coronavirus 
lures to infect a broad range of organizations, encrypting 
their systems after stealing sensitive information and 
then publicly leaking data if the ransom is not paid 
(Cyfirma, 2020). Victims have been diverse and include 
utility sector contractors, petroleum suppliers, retailers, 
or IT service providers (Cyfirma, 2020). 
*** 
Overall, the general observation regarding 
cybercriminals echoes the conditions laid out in section 
1.3, which note a lack of radical change in the cyber 
threat landscape  and general continuity and combined 
with targeted adaptation. On the one hand, we observe 
a new wave of amateur cybercriminals fostered by the 
economic and socio-technical context – indications for 
which can be identified in the aforementioned volume 
of relatively unsophisticated attacks and the increase in 
the sales of grayware services/tools. On the other hand, 
the majority of professional cybercriminal threat actors 
observed remain – as could be expected – the same 
groups as before the pandemic using known or 
repurposed tools. Among these, some threat actors that 
were previously inactive have seemingly resumed their 
activities to exploit the situation. However, while the 
coronavirus crisis has undeniably been a boon for many 
cybercriminals, it is worth recalling that many have also 
continued their often well-established activities and 
schemes using non-coronavirus related lures. 
One other noteworthy observation pertaining to 
cybercriminals’ adversarial behavior has been the 
display of ethical and moral stances against the 
exploitation of the fear, death, and misery resulting 
from the coronavirus pandemic for financial gain. 
According to a report by the threat intelligence firm 
Digital Shadows, in the early months of the pandemic, 
discussions around COVID-19 had been very heated and 
attracted attention on the dark web – as much as on the 
clear web. While many discussions expectedly revolved 
around the best and different ways to exploit the then-
looming coronavirus crisis, other atypical discussion 
threads had also been reported (CyberPeace Institute, 
2020; Guirakhoo, 2020a; Photon Research team, 2020). 
These have notably focused on the ethicality of 
exploiting the crisis for financial gain, with many users 
discouraging others from promoting the exploitation of 
the pandemic. They also focused on providing health 
advice, up-to-date information on the infection trends 
and expressions of solidarity with those affected, 
particularly in Italy. 
These seemingly humane and benign discussions 
correspond with vows of major ransomware groups, 
such as Maze, DoppelPaymer, Ryuk, Sodinokibi/Revil, 
PwndLocker or Ako, to not attack the healthcare 
sector(Abrams, 2020a). Anecdotally, this pledge took 
place after Lawrence Abrams – the creator of journal 
BleepingComputer – reached out to these cybercrime 
groups. Following these declarations, reports have 
confirmed preliminary signs of good faith, such as steps 
taken by the groups behind the Maze and 
DoppelPaymer ransomware in offering ransomware 
recovery services (i.e. decryption) to  affected medical 
facilities free of charge or at a discounted rate (Winder, 
2020). The Maze group has also removed more than 
2300 highly sensitive medical files from former patients 
of Hammersmith Medicines Research (HMR) from its 
website (Intsights, 2020). 
These unusual promises have nonetheless been 
problematic for several reasons. First, despite them, the 
attacks against critical medical facilities seem to have 
continued. For instance, in April, reports have shown 
that the Ryuk ransomware group had persisted in its 
efforts against the healthcare sector and targeted at 
least ten healthcare providers, including a healthcare 
network of nine hospitals. One of the hospitals targeted 
by the Ryuk ransomware was in a US state profoundly 
affected by the coronavirus pandemic (Hope, 2020b). 
Furthermore, by releasing patient data these groups 
also contributed to putting the concerned individuals in 
harms’ way even more.  
Second, while such promises – if ever respected 
– might have been made by some of the major actors–a 
considerable number of other malicious actors 
remained active without any measure of self-restraint. 
These actors recognized the opportunity and readily 
filled the gap. This is notably illustrated by the number 
of attacks against the medical sector described later in 
section 2.3. In addition, these promises only concerned 
the health sector. A number of other critical sectors and 
institutions that helped respond to the pandemic (e.g. 
the food and energy industries, education institutions, 
and others) continued to be targets of such attacks. 
Third, this display of what might appear as 
“honor among thieves” remains highly dubious. While 
cybercriminals might even be personally affected by the 
pandemic (including through family or friends) these 
declarations, at least from major groups, seem to have 
been more motivated by self-preservation than by 
empathy or ethics. Indeed, due to the amount of media 
coverage of these attacks and the public outcry that they 
generated, there might have been a concrete fear that 
they would attract a forceful response from law 
enforcement agencies and the cybersecurity community 





at large. This seems to be particularly true as there has 
been a considerable amount of bottom-up mobilization 
by the community – in the form of cybersecurity militias 
(e.g. the COVID CTI League) – to help fight attacks 
against the health sector (Scammell, 2020).   
2.1.2 States and State-Sponsored Actors 
Despite the widespread social, political, and 
professional disruption, state and state-sponsored 
actors have been active in cyberspace during this 
pandemic. This comes without surprise as, from the 
2015 Paris attacks to the Ebola pandemic, state-
sponsored groups have often leveraged and exploited 
current tragic world event to advance their financial or 
strategic aims (Cimpanu, 2020b).  
The aims of these groups vary and are often 
ambiguous. Some state-sponsored groups have sought 
to exert influence, whether by shaping or altering 
narratives in the context of government responses to 
the coronavirus outbreak. One blatant example includes 
the attempts by both the US and China to steer the 
narrative around the origin, subsequent spread and 
responsibility for the rapid proliferation of the 
coronavirus in the early months of the pandemic. To 
pursue this, they used a variety of cyber-enabled 
influence operations (CIO) and techniques, such as a mix 
of white (i.e. official source), gray (i.e. unknown source) 
and black (i.e. usurped source) propaganda across a 
variety of platforms17 (DiResta, et al., 2020).   
Another aim has been disruption (e.g. of the 
response against the coronavirus), whether by fostering 
distrust or sowing confusion between the population 
and the government. This was notably the case in early 
February in the US, where coordinated efforts to spread 
disinformation (e.g. conspiracy theories) and to alarm 
about the pandemic were observed (Glenza, 2020). 
According to the US State Department, thousands of 
Russian online  accounts – previously identified as 
involved in disseminating Russian-backed messages 
related to major events such as the war in Syria, the 
Yellow Vest protests in France and Chile’s mass 
demonstrations – were behind the spread of some of 
these messages (Glenza, 2020).  
Disruptive cyberattacks (e.g. through 
ransomware) were also observed against critical 
infrastructure (CI). The pandemic has heightened the 
risk profile of critical (information) infrastructure, due to 
the potential catastrophic and life-threatening after-
effects. One notable case was observed in mid-April 
when two Czech hospitals were attacked by – according 
to an anonymous Czech official – a “serious and 
advanced adversary” (Reuters, 2020a, 2020b; Wiggen, 
2020).   Specialists meanwhile have also observed some 
                                                                
17 For an in-depth discussion of Chinese influence efforts during the 
pandemic please see the forthcoming CSS Cyberdefense Report 
“Active Control and Covert Enablers” by Jakob Bund.  
degree of espionage. The general lack of information 
around many aspects of the current crisis has led a 
number of states to resort to cyberespionage to gain 
vital strategic information, including on the spread of 
the coronavirus, different national policies for 
containing the virus, and potential drugs as well as 
vaccines (Wiggen, 2020). A number of these cases 
against western medical institutions and governments 
have been denounced and attributed to various threat 
actors from China and Russia (National Cyber Security 
Centre, 2020a, 2020b). 
While the full extent to which states have 
engaged in such activities can never be totally 
uncovered, Google, in April, detected over a dozen 
state-sponsored hacking groups using the coronavirus to 
craft phishing emails and attempt to distribute malware 
(Huntley, 2020). Microsoft observed 16 different nation-
state actors either targeting customers involved in the 
global COVID-19 response efforts or using the crisis in 
themed lures to expand their credential theft and 
malware delivery tactics (Burt, 2020). The following 
paragraphs describe the discovered operations, 
ordering them by their “assumed” affiliated nations. As 
a renewed caveat, these observations are by and large 
based on publicly available threat reports from western 




Chinese threat actors (e.g. Emissary Panda) have been 
very proactive during this pandemic. Indeed, in  early 
March – which corresponds to the time when the 
Chinese infection rate was slowing down –  China was 
one of the main points of origin for spear-phishing and 
malware campaigns leveraging coronavirus lures 
(Cimpanu, 2020b). Some of these campaigns specifically 
revolved around US COVID-19 research, as declared by  
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
(FBI and CISA, 2020; Wiggen, 2020). It is possible that 
other nations were targeted by similar cyberespionage 
endeavors.  
In addition, the two Chinese APTs Mustang 
Panda and Vicious Panda were discovered to have 
targeted various individuals and elements of the public 
sector in Vietnam, Mongolia, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines  with phishing emails containing spyware (in 
this case, targets received messages with a compressed 
file archive in the attachment that installed a Trojan) 
(Cimpanu, 2020b; Intsights, 2020). These emails were 
purporting to carry coronavirus-related messages from 
authoritative and official sources, such as the 
Vietnamese prime minister or the Mongolian ministry of 





foreign affairs. The aim was to take screenshots, 
exfiltrate, delete and edit files, and to remotely execute 
processes (including through the use of penetration 
testing tools like Cobalt Strike or the PlugX remote 




In addition to the aforementioned coronavirus-related 
disinformation campaign targeting the US that has been 
linked to Russian accounts, the cybersecurity 
community detected one other major Russian campaign 
perpetrated by the Hades group, which has ties to APT28 
(aka Fancy Bear) (Intsights, 2020). The US and the UK 
have previously identified APT28 as operated by the 
Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) (National Cyber 
Security Centre, 2018; US District Court Western District 
of Pennsylvania, 2018). Specifically, the group in mid-
February engaged in a multifaceted campaign – dubbed 
“Tricky Mouse” – against Ukraine (Malwarebytes Threat 
Intelligence, 2020).  
In its first phase, the campaign included a large-
scale phishing campaign imitating the Ukrainian Center 
for Public Health and containing a lure with fake 
documentation about COVID-19. Similarly to the 
aforementioned Chinese cyberattack, the 
documentation included a hidden C# backdoor Trojan 
that gave remote control of the device (Intsights, 2020). 
The second phase was a disinformation campaign 
conducted through social media. It mainly focused on 
disseminating fake reports on the increasing number of 
COVID-19 infections in Ukraine, coinciding with the 
arrival of a flight of evacuees from China and COVID-19 
patients from eastern Ukraine (Intsights, 2020). While 
direct causality is hard to establish, the operation seems 
to have been somewhat successful as protest did 
emerge in several parts of the country with reports that 
protesters blocked the access to some hospitals 
(Cimpanu, 2020b). 
 Russia has also engaged in espionage targeting 
vaccine research and espionage on intellectual property 
across the western world, notably through APT 29 (aka 
Cozy Bear), which was found – as publicly reported by 
the UK’s NCSC, the Canadian Communication Security 
Establishment (CSE), and the US’s National Security 
Agency (NSA) – to target various organizations involved 
in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United 
States and the United Kingdom (National Cyber Security 
Centre et al., 2020). According to an assessment by the 
UK NCSC and malware samples disclosed by US Cyber 
Command, APT29 has been using custom malware in 
these operations – i.e. WellMess and WellMail – which 
had not been previously publicly associated with the 
group. 
Russian threat actors have also continued their 
previous campaigns but modified their lures to exploit 
COVID-19. One of these was operated by the APT 
Gamaredon (aka Primitive Bear), which apparently 
intensified its efforts to compromise Ukrainian defense 
and intelligence targets. The attacks include both 
cyberespionage and attempted sabotage of physical 
assets in mid-February (Council on Foreign Relations, 




Pakistan’s APT36 (aka Transparent Tribe, ProjectM, 
Mythic Leopard, and TEMP.Lapis) also sought to take 
advantage of the opportunity presented by the crisis to 
further its espionage activities – notably against India’s 
defense establishment, embassies, and other 
government agencies (Threat intelligence team, 2020). 
Specifically, threat intelligence researchers have found 
that the group was spreading a malicious document 
spoofed to look like it came from Indian government 
websites. Once opened, the document enabled macros, 
which executed the Crimson RAT payload, which is used 
for a wide range of cyberespionage activities, including 
stealing credentials; listing running processes, drives, 
and directories on the victim’s machine; retrieving files 
from its command and control (C&C) server; using 
custom TCP protocol for its C&C communications; 
collecting information about antivirus software; and 
capturing screenshots (Cimpanu, 2020b; Threat 




In early February, the reportedly Indian APT Patchwork 
(aka Dropping Elephant, Candlefish, Chinastrats, APT-C-
09, Quilted Tiger) was identified to be sending phishing 
emails with a COVID-19 theme, using malicious Excel 
documents to target Chinese organizations in Wuhan, 
triggering a Chinese patriotic hacktivist retaliation 
(iDefense, 2020; Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence, 
2020). It also reportedly targeted Pakistan with a 
phishing attack using information regarding an alleged 
local Pakistani Army deployment to help combat COVID-




Iran, which has acutely suffered from the pandemic, 
recording the highest death toll in the Middle East, 
seems to have been desperate for intelligence and 
information related to the spread and treatment of the 
virus. While no definite proof has been made public to 
date, an Iranian backed threat actor has allegedly been 
behind a wave of phishing messages in March that were 
directed against the WHO in an attempt to access its 
digital systems (Bing et al., 2020). According to some 
reporting, this attack would be consistent with methods 
used by APT35 (aka Charming kitten, Phsophorus, Ajax 
security, Newsbeef) (Satter et al., 2020). Later in April, 
the same APT group seemingly launched a number of 





phishing attacks against the pharmaceutical company 
Gilead Sciences, which has been working on the 
development and distribution of treatments for COVID-




A group using similar IPs as the Syrian Electronic Army, 
which operates out of multiple cells both within Syria 
and in neighboring countries, reportedly used COVID-19 
as lure to get users to install mobile applications 
targeting Arabic-language users; these malicious apps 
had names such as “Covid19,” “Telegram Covid_19,” 
“Android Telegram” and “Threema Arabic,” among 




In late February, South Korean officials received phishing 
emails with malicious documents attached that claimed 
to provide information on how the South Korean 
government planned to deal with the coronavirus crisis 
(Intsights, 2020). The emails contained malicious 
documents weaponized with a spyware called SpyLoop, 
which continuously collects and sends device/user 
information (Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence, 2020). 
Although not as sophisticated as the Russian campaign, 
the phishing campaign aimed at South Korea delivered 
BabyShark, a malware strain previously utilized by a 
North Korean hacker group known as Kimsuky (aka 
Velvet Chollima) (Intsights, 2020; Malwarebytes Threat 
Intelligence, 2020). 
Another North Korean APT active during the 
first half of 2020 has been APT37 (aka Konni). In mid-
March, the group was recorded as sending spear-
phishing messages, notably to South Korean targets,  
containing COVID-19 warnings, ironically advising 
readers to watch out for spikes in North Korean 
cybercrime related to the spread of the virus 
(Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence, 2020).  
The Lazarus Group has also been using coronavirus 
lures to target different cryptocurrency businesses to 
steal cryptocurrency for financial gain (GreAT, 2020a). 
The same group has also targeted six countries – namely 
Singapore, Japan, Korea, India, the US, and the UK – 
which had announced significant financial support for 
businesses reeling from coronavirus restrictions. The 
hacking campaign involved phishing emails that looked 
like they came from various authorities in charge of 
COVID-19 support initiatives dispensing government 
assistance. The over five million phishing emails were 
designed to drive potential applicants to fake websites 







According to contested reporting by the Chinese 
cybersecurity firm Qihoo 360, DarkHotel, which has 
possible ties to South Korea and has previously been 
active in East Asia, has launched an apparent espionage 
campaign against Chinese government institutions and 
agencies. The campaign has sought to exploit over 200 
VPN network servers – notably using a zero-day exploit 
to gain control over Sangfor VPN servers (Stone, 2020a). 
The report by Qihoo 360 said that 174 of these servers 
were located on networks of government agencies in 
Shanghai and Beijing as well as the networks of various 
Chinese diplomatic missions (e.g. in Italy, UK, Pakistan, 
India, and Israel) (Cimpanu, 2020d). In addition, the 
same group apparently also conducted operations 
against the WHO, for which it set up a fake website 
spoofing the WHO’s internal email domain to steal 




Starting in February, APT32 (aka Ocean lotus, Sea Lotus), 
which regularly targets the private and public sector in 
Southeast Asia, has been observed using malicious 
macro-embedded documents with coronavirus themes 
to target Chinese targets (iDefense, 2020; Malwarebytes 
Threat Intelligence, 2020). In this METALJACK attack, the 
malicious document dropped the Denis Trojan, a 
malware family that has been developed by this group 
(Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence, 2020). 
 
*** 
As for cybercriminals, the main observation 
regarding state-sponsored threat actors is one of 
relative continuity, at least in terms of the active actors 
themselves. Most of the state-sponsored activities 
detected can be linked to known groups – this ties in 
with the observation that no new major actors appear 
to have been discovered during that period. This finding 
is owed in part to fact that, as is commonly the case, 
most newly recorded malicious campaigns are not 
immediately attributed to specific actors. There are of 
course anecdotal exceptions to this trend, such as the 
possibly new threat actor of unknown origin claiming to 
be threats groups APT28 and the Armada collective to 
conduct extortion by DDoS in the US (NJCCIC, 2020).  
As has been the case before the pandemic, the 
level of sophistication of the attacks by different threat 
actor groups seems to vary across the board. However, 
it is clear that APT groups, similarly to cybercriminals, 
have opportunistically exploited the COVID-19 
pandemic as a theme – this, however, does not 
represent a shift in terms of their techniques, tools, and 
processes. Furthermore, it must be underlined that it 
has been recorded – albeit not explored in detail here as 
it is outside of the scope of this report –, that most APT 
actors seem to have continued their non-COVID-19-





related cyber operations. For instance, in April, Iranian-
backed threat actors allegedly attempted to hack into 
Israel’s water infrastructure. However, the extent to 
which state-sponsored threat actors’ operations have 
generally been disrupted by the pandemic’s socio-
technical and operational changes remains unknown – 
and will probably stay so in the following months or 
years.  
Finally, as previously underlined in this report, 
geopolitics remain – without surprise – an important 
motive for APT actors. This is particularly visible in terms 
of their choice of targets, most of which were aligned 
with their regional and strategic interests. In the context 
of the pandemic, this included national and 
international health and research institutions but also 
the public sector and armed forces all around the world. 
Most notably, Southeast Asia was a very active region 
for APT activities during the first half of 2020, with 
Chinese-speaking groups launching campaigns both 
within its neighborhood (e.g. across Central Asia) and 
against adversaries (e.g. US or Europe). China was also 
targeted early on by other regional actors, such as 
Indian, Vietnamese, and South Korean APT groups.  
Meanwhile, state-sponsored cyber actors locked 
into well-established rivalries or conflicts have also 
leveraged the pandemic to their ends. As shown earlier, 
this includes Russian threat actors in Ukraine, Pakistani 
and Indian actors against each other, or Syrian actors in 
the neighboring countries.  
2.2 Types of Cyber Threats: Tactics, 
Tools, and Procedures 
Various threat actors have leveraged a great variety of 
tools and tactics to achieve their aims (see Table 1 for an 
overview). The following section describes, exemplifies, 
and seeks to quantify the most frequently encountered 
forms of malicious cyber activity related to the 
coronavirus pandemic. As a note, the first two address 
specific threats to the teleworking infrastructure and 
mobile devices, both of which have been particularly 
affected by the pandemic, while the last six subsections 
address relatively general and prolific threats, some of 












                                                                
18 I.e. an automated brute force attack based on leaked credentials. 
Table 1: Overview of COVID-19-related cyber threats by actor 
type (author's design, based on sources listed in this report) 
X = Confirmed 
? = Unconfirmed 
Criminals APTs 
Credential Stuffing X X 
RDP Brute Force X ? 
Vulnerability Exploits 
(e.g. VPNs)  
X X 
Zoom Bombing ? ? 
Fake COVID-19 Apps  X ? 
Mobile Malware X ? 
Scams & Fraud  X ? 
Extortion X  
(Spear-)Phishing X X 
Domain & URL 
Spoofing 
X X 
Ransomware X ? 
Data Wiper X  
Crypto-miner X X 
Trojan – Spyware X X 
BEC X  
Malspam X X 
DDoS X ? 
2.2.1 Teleworking Infrastructure Threats: 
Credential Stuffing, RPS Brute Force, and 
Vulnerable Teleworking Applications 
A particularly important coronavirus-related cyber 
threat trend has been the rise of cyberattacks against 
teleworking infrastructure and applications. With the 
mass movement toward telework malicious actors have 
increasingly exploited a variety of cloud-based 
teleworking tools and software, such as conferencing 
applications and VPNs (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure 
Security Agency and National Cyber Security Centre, 
2020; McAfee, 2020a).  
With regard to the malicious use of cloud-based 
conference applications, Skype led the pack in April with 
at least  120,000 suspicious files using its name for both 
malware and adware (Whitney, 2020). Regarding other 
applications, a study from cybersecurity firm Kaspersky 
found that out of 1300 suspicious files they discovered 
and analyzed, 42 per cent were disguised as Zoom, 22 
per cent as WebEx, 13 per cent as GoToMeeting, 11 per 
cent as Flock, and 11 per cent as Slack (Whitney, 2020). 
Zoom has been most targeted, seemingly due to its 
rising popularity.  
Credential stuffing attacks 18 have been the most 
common type of attacks against these services, with 
threat actors trying to compromise accounts to sell them 
on hacking forums. Cracking communities such as 
Cracked, Nulled and Raid Forums have all released 
configurations for common credential stuffing tools, 





such as Open Bullet (Cyfirma, 2020). These 
configurations are offered for free and allow anyone 
with the software to begin stealing Zoom accounts. In 
one notable instance, a database containing over 2300 
compromised Zoom credentials was leaked on the 
darknet. Victims included banks, consultancy 
companies, educational facilities, healthcare providers, 
and software vendors (Cyfirma, 2020; O’Donnell, 2020). 
In addition, threat actors have created thousands 
of new domains containing the word "Zoom". As many 
businesses and educational institutions shifted to online 
platforms, many malicious actors have registered fake 
Zoom domains for their phishing attacks (Check Point 
Software Technologies, 2020c; Cybersecurity & 
Infrastructure Security Agency and National Cyber 
Security Centre, 2020). As of mid-May, the firm Check 
Point Software Technologies had recorded over 6500 
new Zoom domains, 1.5 per cent of which were 
identified as  malicious and 13 per cent as suspicious 
(Check Point Software Technologies, 2020d). 
Regarding Zoom specifically, one of the most 
high-profile attacks/nuisances has been “Zoom 
bombing”. This practice involves pranksters uninvitedly 
joining unsecured Zoom calls, usually to display 
offensive or illegal content. There have been several 
high-profile incidents. On 10 April, for instance, a US 
House Oversight Committee meeting discussing 
women’s rights in Afghanistan was disrupted at least 
three times. This practice was greatly helped by the 
development of forums (e.g. “Zoom leaks”) and tools 
(e.g. zWarDial) that discover and display unsecured 
Zoom meetings (Cyfirma, 2020).  
On top of that, accidental exposure of recorded 
Zoom meetings has also been a concern. In April for 
instance, thousands of recorded Zoom meetings – e.g. 
business discussion, therapy sessions, sexual content 
from private calls – were made public, apparently by 
mistake. At least 15,000 exposed videos were 
discovered by a security researcher following a scan of 
unsecured cloud storage (Harwell, 2020). The problem 
lied in the file-naming system used by Zoom, which, 
combined with a user accidentally uploading the private 
file to the internet from their computer, made them 
easily discoverable (Harwell, 2020). 
In addition, reports have also indicated that there 
has been a spike of interest in vulnerabilities of popular 
online platforms, notably for industrial espionage. Data 
from the threat intelligence firm Insights shows that 
malicious actors discussed and attempted to exploit 
different online platform vulnerabilities (Intsights, 
2020). The main targets have been Zoom, Webex, and 
Microsoft Teams (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2020a). Reports 
in April indicated that two critical zero-days 
vulnerabilities – which allowed to hack and spy on calls 
– for the Windows and MacOS Zoom applications, were 
for sale on the web (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2020b). Also 
in April, Zoom was hacked and 500,000 stolen Zoom 
passwords were offered for sale on the darkweb.  
Regarding VPNs, some threat actors (e.g. 
Darkhotel) have exploited VPN network servers for 
cyberespionage. Meanwhile, others have targeted VPNs 
as part of their DDoS attacks (see section 2.2.8). More 
generally, CISA in the US and the NCSC in the UK have 
observed actors scanning for publicly known 
vulnerabilities in Citrix. One vulnerability – i.e.CVE-2019-
19781 – and its exploitation have been widely reported 
since early January 2020. Other examples include 
vulnerabilities affecting VPN products from Pulse 
Secure, Fortinet, or Palo Alto (Cybersecurity & 
Infrastructure Security Agency and National Cyber 
Security Centre, 2020).  
2.2.2 Mobile Threats: Fake Apps, Mobile Malware, 
and Vulnerable Contact Tracing Apps  
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, due to the increasing 
reliance and immature cybersecurity, mobile phones 
and connected networks and devices have increasingly 
become the target of threat actors, notably during the 
pandemic. The threats were varied and mostly took the 
form of smishing (i.e. phishing through SMS), fake or 
malicious apps, mobile ransomware and Trojans as well 
as attacks against official contact tracing apps.   
During this pandemic – smishing , in particular, 
has been a growing threat to individuals and companies 
alike. As for email-based phishing, many of these attacks 
have leveraged COVID-19 themes. In South Korea, for 
instance, by mid-February, over 10,000 SMS had been 
sent to South Koreans pretending to come from 
companies providing free protective material (Mu-Hyun, 
2020). During Q1 in the US, companies apparently 
recorded a 37 per cent increase in smishing (Schless, 
2020). These attempts followed a variety of purposes, 
from malware dissemination to credential stealing.  
According to the antivirus company Bitdefender, 
a huge spike in applications containing “COVID” or 
“corona” in their name, packaging, or file was registered 
in March. Researchers found that, in early March, 
Google Play  listed over 2100 apps in Europe that used 
such keywords, compared to 500 in the US and around 
1000 in Asia  (Asoltanei et al., 2020). These apps varied 
from common medical information apps to newly 
developed or repurposed apps about the spread of the 
virus. Anecdotally, many non-coronavirus-related apps, 
such as games (e.g. Bubble Shooter Merge), have 
abused Google Play’s ranking algorithm by adding 
coronavirus to their name to gain in visibility. 
Some of the different apps – some of which were 
actually found on third-party marketplaces – had been 
repacked to include aggressive adware while others had 
been bundled with SMS-sending malware, ransomware 
or banking Trojans such as Joker, Cerberus, GINP and 
Eventbot (Asoltanei et al., 2020; Moran, 2020). For 
instance, the creators of a new modification of the Ginp 
banking Trojan renamed their malware “Coronavirus 
Finder” and then began offering it for 0.75 EUR disguised 





as an app supposedly capable of detecting people 
nearby infected with the coronavirus (Chebyshev et al., 
2020). 
In addition, and for the first time, the Anubis 
banking Trojan was spotted as part of an Android 
coronavirus malware campaign. The application imitates 
a coronavirus information site and, on installation, asks 
for excessive access and permissions (Asoltanei et al., 
2020). Initially, Anubis targeted countries ranging from 
the US and India to France, Italy, Germany, Australia, 
and Poland. This Android version, however, seems to 
have targeted Turkey, by impersonating the legitimate 
website to which it redirects users (Asoltanei et al., 
2020).  
In another case, an Android app which offered 
face masks and safety kits to worried individuals, 
delivered an SMS Trojan, which collects the contact list 
of the victim’s phone directory and sends automatic 
SMS to discovered contacts to spread itself (Khan et al., 
2020). In some iterations it also downloaded a mobile 
ransomware (Desai, 2020). 
One particular well-reported ransomware case 
has been that of the new CovidLock malware, which 
circulated through the malicious Android app “COVID19 
Tracker”. After download, the ransomware locks the 
victim's phone, who is then given 48 hours to pay 100 
USD in bitcoin to recover access. Similarly to other 
ransomware, threats include the deletion of the phone 
data and leakage of account information on social media 
(Khan et al., 2020; Sahel & Anderson, 2020). 
As the pandemic progressed, malicious actors 
have adapted their targeting and methods. After 
leveraging the initial need for information with some 
fake tracking maps, some actors have turned their 
attention to governmental contact tracing apps. Indeed, 
with different governments around the world 
developing, releasing, and promoting their app, 
malicious actors have jumped on the occasion to exploit 
both these apps and the public campaigns for their 
adoption.  
For instance, while the UK’s National Health 
Service (NHS) app was still in the test phase, some 
unknown actor deployed and released a closely-
resembling fake of the official app, which was in truth a 
banking Trojan (Smithers, 2020). The campaign attached 
to it also included an SMS phishing scam intended to 
make people believe they had been in contact with 
someone who had been tested positive for COVID-19 
(Stone, 2020b). Another conspicuous discovered 
campaign has targeted Android users with a new 
ransomware called CryCryptor. It was distributed via two 
spoofed websites under the guise of an official COVID-
19 tracing app provided by Health Canada (Stefanko, 
2020).  
More broadly, one report by researchers at the 
cybersecurity firm Anomali have found that at least 
twelve additional applications posing as coronavirus 
contact tracing apps – but not available on the Google 
Play app store – were designed to steal personal and 
financial information from unwitting Android users with 
various malware such as Spynote, Anubis or other 
Trojans and adware (Anomali Threat Research Team, 
2020; Stone, 2020b). Targeted countries included India, 
Italy, Singapore, Iran, Russia, and Brazil (Anomali Threat 
Research Team, 2020). 
With respect to the official contact tracing apps, 
there have been no reports of any being the subject of 
hacks or  cyberespionage. This does not mean that none 
were compromised, especially as many of these apps 
have been developed in a hurry and have shown some 
vulnerabilities. In a recent study of 17 government-
sponsored apps, the mobile application security firm 
Guardsquare found that less than a third had an 
encryption capability that protects sensitive information 
in the source code, and less than half had the ability to 
detect unauthorized requests that seek access to 
restricted data on the phone (Goodes, 2020; Starks, 
2020).  
The most striking case has been that of Qatar, 
where the mandatory contact tracing app – EHTERAZ – 
suffered from a vulnerability that would have allowed 
hackers to obtain the national ID numbers and health 
status of over a million individuals (Amnesty 
International, 2020; Starks, 2020). Another example is 
India’s app – Arrogyasetu – where a researcher 
discovered a security gap that allowed him to determine 
who was sick in individual homes (Starks, 2020). 
Meanwhile, researchers have also uncovered seven 
security flaws in the UK’s pilot app NHSX – some of 
which have since been addressed (Culnane and Teague, 
2020). One of the Netherland’s pilot apps – Covid19 
Alert! – also suffered a leak exposing 200 names, emails, 
and encrypted passwords (Muncaster, 2020c).   
2.2.3 Scams, Frauds, and Extortion 
One of the main trends observed in the first half of 2020 
has been the surge in coronavirus-related product 
frauds, scam templates and hoaxes on the clear-, deep- 
and darkweb markets. Scammers have been very 
creative and developed a great variety of scams, many 
of which exploited specific regional or national 
characteristics (e.g. tailored to legal requirements, local 
language, or new policies) alongside the general climate 
of fear, uncertainty, and stress described earlier. 
The most common types of scams were around 
medical material, such as test kits, masks or fake 
treatments and drugs (Arsene, 2020). Indeed, during this 
pandemic, shadow pharmacies that promote a variety of 
drugs (e.g. for male erectile dysfunction) via spam or 
hacked websites have experienced a large increase in 
demand for treatment usually used to fight lupus, 
malaria and arthritis thanks largely to unfounded 
suggestions that these therapies can help combat 
coronavirus infections (Krebs, 2020c).  





In March and April, hydroxychloroquine, for 
example, rivaled  the usual primary products of such 
shadow pharmacies — generic Viagra and Cialis. The 
pseudo-treatment accounted for as much as 25 to 30 
per cent of all sales in April (Krebs, 2020a). This sudden 
interest was particularly reinforced when various 
influential and public figures, including President Trump 
and Elon Musk in the US or Dr. Raoult19 in France, started 
to suggested without sufficient scientific basis that it 
was an effective treatment for COVID-19 (Krebs, 2020a).  
More sophisticated scams, targeting 
governmental procurement structures have also been 
conducted. One notable and sophisticated example 
includes a group of fraudsters that succeeded in getting 
the authorities in Germany’s most populous region, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, to part with 2.6 million EUR. 
The money was a down-payment for ten million masks. 
More than 50 vehicles were lined up to import the fake 
masks from the Netherlands before the ruse was 
discovered. It involved a website registered in Spain, an 
intermediary in Ireland, and a firm in the Netherlands 
with a website that turned out to have been cloned by 
the scammers. With the help of financial institutions in 
three countries, investigators managed to block the 
payments, including 500,000 EUR on the way to Nigeria 
(The Economist, 2020). 
In addition to the rise of coronavirus goods-based 
scams, researchers and agencies (e.g.  the Internet 
Crime Complaint Center) have registered an increase in 
reports of online extortion scams (FBI, 2020a). These 
used scare tactics in an attempt to manipulate the users 
into paying bitcoin (on average the equivalent of 2000 
to 4000 USD). Specifically, these scams leveraged 
prevalent paranoia and fear by threatening to infect the 
target’s family with the coronavirus (Trend Micro, 
2020a). 
Another widely prevalent scam has used fake 
donation requests, which claimed to be relief or health 
organizations and asked for donations in bitcoin. One 
such example includes that of a group called 
COVID19Fund. 
A last type of scams includes fraudulent shipping 
and insurance fees being charged by criminal 
actors. Opportunistic actors have citied false COVID-19-
related updates to shipping laws, regulations, and 
requirements as justification for charging made-up 
fees.  Examples have included fraudulent demands for 
COVID-19 insurance fees after a purchase for the 
delivery of live pets or a fake “refundable” shipping 
insurance fees (FBI, 2020b; Walter, 2020). 
 
Indicator of Scale and Costs 
 
According to security company Proofpoint, four out of 
five scam emails in March used coronavirus themes in 
                                                                
19 Based on his non-randomized research, the head of the Institut 
Hospitalo Universitaire Méditeranée – Dr. Raoult – declared as early 
some way (Ranger, 2020). Quantitatively speaking, in 
March alone, reports indicated a 400 per cent increase 
in coronavirus-related fraud, at least in the UK (Action 
Fraud, 2020a). For the same period, this amounted to 
over 500,000 messages, 300,000 malicious URLs, 
200,000 malicious attachments with coronavirus 
themes across more than 130 campaigns (Ranger, 2020). 
By the end of April, the UK’s NCSC had taken down 2000 
campaigns and 471 fake online shops in the UK alone 
(Action Fraud, 2020b).  
This rise in scams seems to be a general, 
opportunistically driven trend extending to other 
European countries – to various degrees. For instance, 
in Switzerland, the academically led website 
“coronafraud.ch” registered at least 160 cases of 
medical equipment scams in April (Soguel, 2020). This 
contrasts with the overall 2938 registered scam 
incidents registered by MELANI, the great majority being 
subscription scams (270), fake sextortion (578), and 
domain scams (63) (MELANI, 2020). The Swiss domain 
managing foundation SWITCH, however, did not 
necessarily assume that the number of fake webshops 
has increased during the lockdown period as most 
malicious domains using .ch or .li had been identified 
earlier (Städeli, 2020). 
The financial loss associated with these scams 
has been considerable. In March, the UK’s National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau reported over 21 cases of such 
coronavirus-related fraud schemes, which, at the time, 
resulted in losses of over 800,000 GBP in the UK alone 
(Guirakhoo, 2020b). By the end of May, 4.6 GBP million 
had been lost to coronavirus-related scams with around 
11,206 victims of phishing campaigns (Brunt, 2020). For 
comparison, in the UK, the cost of purchase scams in 
2019 amounted to 59 million GBP (UK Finance, 2020). In 
the US the Federal Trade Commission claimed that at 
least 13 million USD had been lost to COVID-19-related 
scams in the first four months of 2020, with a median 
loss of 570 USD per scam (Cyfirma, 2020). The amount 
later soared to 145 million USD in September (PYMNTS, 
2020). For context, the overall cost of scams for 2019 in 
the US stood at 1.9 billion USD (FTC, 2020).  
2.2.4 Phishing and Social Engineering Schemes  
Even before the pandemic, social engineering, by way of 
(spear-)phishing and spoofing (e.g. of domains, email 
addresses, and websites), was a very widespread 
technique, especially in the early phases of the attack 
chain. It is often only the preliminary step for an attacker 
to gain access, whether by stealing credentials or 
deploying malware (see section 2.2.5).  
In the first six months of 2020, attackers have 
seized the opportunity to exploit the general global 
anxiety, uncertainty, and false information surrounding 
as February 2020 that hydroxychloroquine was an efficient treatment 
against the coronavirus.   





the pandemic. As a result, phishing emails have 
accounted for the majority of coronavirus-related 
malicious cyber activity (CyberPeace Institute, 2020; 
Interpol, 2020b).  
In terms of format and delivery method, many 
variations of coronavirus-related phishing have been 
detected. As mentioned earlier, most were pushed 
through emails, but other vectors included SMS or social 
media (e.g. through Facebook Messenger). Two 
examples include a WhatsApp phishing campaign 
related to a fake relief fund. Another case used SMS 
delivery to steal credit card information and add an 
additional fee (Ducklin, 2020; Trend Micro, 2020a).  
Lures have been varied, creative, dynamic, and 
responsive to new events (e.g. the setting up of relief 
funds). In addition, reports have shown that phishing 
attempts would often adjust language, content, and the 
imitated source on the basis of their targeted region and 
audience.  
The targets of impersonation and spoofing have 
been as varied as the lures but can be divided into two 
categories. The first being well-established and trusted 
international and governmental institutions in various 
fields. Health-related institutions, such the WHO or the 
health agencies of the US, Canada or Australia, were the 
first to be imitated (Proofpoint Threat Research Team, 
2020). Other targets were the official government pages 
of France, the UK, and Canada. In the scope of their 
“relief fund” phishing campaigns, malicious actors also 
spoofed institutions such as the US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC) or the City of Westminster City Council in the UK 
(Proofpoint Threat Research Team, 2020). NATO and the 
UN were also imitated in some campaigns (Arsene, 
2020) as well as Switzerland’s Federal Office of Public 
Health (MELANI, 2020).  
The second type of targets were a host of online 
services (e.g. video streaming websites), to which many 
people turned while at home. One of the main targets 
was Netflix, which was the subject of a Facebook 
Messenger campaign that promised two months of free 
access before redirecting the victim to a fake Netflix 
login page in order to steal their credentials (Trend 
Micro, 2020a).  
The widespread phishing phenomenon around 
the coronavirus crisis was particularly abetted by the 
relatively good quality and availability of ready-to-use 
templates on various forums (Proofpoint Threat 
Research Team, 2020). This made it easy for threat 
actors to quickly create high-quality, malicious web 
domains to insert into their coronavirus phishing 




                                                                
20 i.e. from 1188 incidents in all of February to 9116 incidents as of 26 
March. 
Phishing Scale Indicators 
 
In terms of scale, public reporting varies but overall 
underlines the “dramatic increase” of malicious phishing 
campaigns leveraging coronavirus lures, especially in the 
first couple of months of the pandemic (O’Neill, 2020; 
Wiggen, 2020). For instance, the cybersecurity firm 
Barracuda Networks reported that the number of 
coronavirus phishing emails increased by 667 per cent 
on its network between the first two months of 202020 
(Muncaster, 2020d). In mid-April, Google reported that, 
in just one week, it saw more than 18 million malware 
and phishing emails related to coronavirus scams on a 
daily basis that were sent via Gmail alone. These figures 
are separate from and add to the 240 million daily 
coronavirus-related spam messages Google reported 
(Check Point Software Technologies, 2020c; Kumaran 
and Lugani, 2020; Lyons, 2020). In addition, Google 
disclosed that in January, it registered 149,000 active 
COVID-19 phishing websites. In February, that number 
nearly doubled to 293,000. By March,  that number had 
increased again to 522,000 – a 350 per cent increase 
since January (Radoini, 2020).  
 
Figure 2: Most frequent coronavirus-related phishing subjects 
(author; Interpol, 2020b) 
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In Switzerland , MELANI reported that it was able 
to identify about 3000 unique phishing sites. It also 
recorded an increase in phishing attacks on website 
operators and domains owners in order to gain 
generalized access data (MELANI, 2020). 
Despite this relatively fast increase, some 
reporting highlights that there was an observable peak 
in March, with a subsequent drop in April. The peak 
varied from place to place, for instance in Switzerland, 
this peak, according to MELANI, was in April before 
falling in May (MELANI, 2020). According to Proofpoints’ 
threat research team, this was likely due to a 
combination of saturation for coronavirus payment 
theme phishing templates and a move towards other 
coronavirus themes as many one-time payments had 
been disbursed (2020).  
One other indicator of the scale of phishing 
attempts are domain registrations relating to the 
coronavirus crisis. These include, for instance, key words 
such as “coronavirus”, “corona” or “COVID-19” but also 
“relief payment”, or “cure”. While these domains can be 
used for other purposes than phishing, impersonation 
and spreading malware, including for instance 
misinformation and scams, they are a central element of 
any phishing campaign. Not all of these coronavirus-
related domains were, however, malicious. Many of 
them are used by official institutions to raise awareness, 
such as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in the US or the Federal Office of Public Health 
(FOPH) in Switzerland.  
By the end of April, reports by the cybersecurity 
and hardware company Check Point Software 
Technologies (2020) estimated that among the 20,000 
coronavirus-related domains it had assessed in April, 2 
per cent were definitely malicious and 15 per cent 
suspicious. Interpol published similar estimates for 
March and rated 2000 out of 116,000 reviewed domains 
as malicious and 40,000 as high-risk domains (Interpol, 
2020b). Despite this low percentage, Checkpoint 
Software Technologies highlighted that newly registered 
coronavirus-related domains are still 50 per cent more 
likely to be malicious than other domains (Check Point 
Software Technologies, 2020b). In Switzerland, the 
trend was similar, with an expert from SWITCH, the 
Swiss foundation managing the .ch  and .li domains, 
underlining “a sharp increase in suspicious activity 
reports in connection with new domain registrations” 
(Städeli, 2020). 
Unsurprisingly, in terms of scale and evolution, 
before 2020, only 190 domains using prominent 
keywords related to the pandemic were registered 
(Intsights, 2020). This number then soared, in the first 
months of the epidemic, with a noticeable spike on 12 
February when the WHO named the coronavirus disease 
as COVID-19 (CyberPeace Institute, 2020). According to 
some estimates, in January alone there were over 1400 
registered domains, in February that number increased 
to over 5000 before topping at least 38,000 (116,000 
according to Interpol) by the end of March and over 
90,000 in May (Check Point Software Technologies, 
2020c; Interpol, 2020b; Intsights, 2020; Trend Micro, 
2020a).  
Several reports highlight the speed, particularly 
in March, with which such phishing fronts were created. 
For instance, the threat intelligence firm RiskIQ  
reported to have seen “more than 13,500 suspicious 
domains on 15 March; more than 35,000 domains the 
next day; and more than 17,000 domains the day after 
that.” (Cimpanu, 2020e). The CyberPeace Institute 
reported that the total number of newly registered 
COVID-19-themed domains was around 16,000 on 9 
March before doubling over the course of the week 
(2020). After the peak in March, the number of 
registered domains gradually slowed down as the focus 
changed and some mitigation measures were put in 
place (CyberPeace Institute, 2020). This included, for 
instance, the domain registrar Namecheap blocking the 
registration of applications using “coronavirus” in 
combination with the term “vaccine” (CyberPeace 
Institute, 2020). 
In terms of subjects and focus, one can discern an 
evolution as the months passed by (Check Point 
Software Technologies, 2020d). At the beginning of the 
outbreak – when everybody was eager to track the 
global spread and understand the symptoms – a great 
number of these domains were related to live maps and 
COVID-19 symptoms. Towards the end of March, the 
focus turned to relief packages and stimulus payments 
as various economic and financial plans were deployed 
in several countries. Then, as several countries eased 
their lockdowns, domains related to life after the 
coronavirus became more common, as well as domains 
about a possible second wave of the virus. Throughout 
the pandemic, domains related to tests kits and vaccines 
have remained very common, with slight increases as 
time wore on (Check Point Software Technologies, 
2020d). 
Linked to malicious domains, another phishing 
indicator is the creation of fake URLs associated to the 
coronavirus crisis. These fake URLs, spoofed to look like 
legitimate ones, are normally used alongside malicious 
domains to inject malware once opened. In terms of 
scale, Proofpoint reported that in April over 300,000 
malicious URLs had been created (Proofpoint, 2020). 
The computer security firm McAfee, meanwhile, 
reported that in the first 13 weeks of the pandemic it 
saw the number of fake website increase from 1600 to 
over 39,000 (McAfee, 2020b). In terms of efficiency, the 
cybersecurity firm TrendMicro (2020a) reported that 
between February and the end of March, it had 
recorded over 48,000 hits of malicious URLs related to 
COVID-19 on its network.  
As such, these indicators tend to portray a sharp 
rise in volume and speed of COVID-19-related phishing 
attacks, many of which were opportunistic, leveraging 
pre-existing templates and replacing other types of non-





COVID-19-related malicious actions. However, as 
mentioned in section 1.3, these attacks have not been 
significant when compared to the overall number of 
attacks. 
2.2.5 Malware  
 
Linked to all the above-mentioned phishing activities, 
the coronavirus crisis has also been an excellent 
opportunity for malware distribution, notably through 
malicious links or attachments. According to a 
TrendMicro report, in the first three months (Q1) of 
2020 alone, over 737 malware threatsrelated to 
coronavirus  – many repurposed – were detected (Trend 
Micro, 2020a). Proofpoint researchers in late April 
identified over 200,000 malicious attachments with 
coronavirus themes across over 170 campaigns 
(Proofpoint, 2020).  Both of these numbers have since 
increased. Among the various types of malware, two 
overarching types can be discerned, namely disruptive 
malware (e.g. ransomware or data wipers) and data 
harvesting malware (e.g. Trojans or crypto miner). 
 
Disruptive Malware: Ransomware 
 
Among disruptive malware, the most prevalent form 
found in the wild was ransomware, with ransomware-
as-a-service increasingly becoming an established 
criminal enterprise. Indeed, a report by the 
cybersecurity company Coveware notes that ransom 
demands in the first quarter of this year increased by 33 
per cent compared to the last months of 2019 ( 2020). 
Operationally, these come later in the attack chain and 
usually infect the victim’s system via email attachments, 
links, or through compromised credentials obtained 
with coronavirus lures or other techniques, such as RDP 
brute force attacks (Interpol, 2020a; Khan et al., 2020).  
Overall, malicious actors, such as the  
Maze Ransomware group (aka TA2101), have 
particularly taken advantage of educational, medical, 
and public institutions, as well as businesses – often 
targeting organizations operating under stress – to 
maximize profits. Many criminals seemed to have been 
optimistic that these institutions would be more prone 
to indulge their crime and pay the ransom due to this 
external pressure. This appears to be supported by 
EUROPOL, which noted that the activation and payment 
time for ransomware have diminished (Europol, 2020a).    
Among the myriad of ransomware campaigns 
observed, some deserve more spotlight than others for 
their blatant leveraging of the coronavirus, their 
targeting, and their impact. The first being the new 
ransomware variant dubbed “CoronaVirus.” This 
particular strand was uploaded and spread through a 
                                                                
21 Also known as URL hijacking, it is a form of cybersquatting (sitting 
on sites under someone else’s brand or copyright) that targets 
fake Wise Cleaner – a system optimization software – 
website. The victims, which included the two Czech 
hospitals mentioned above, were lured to download the 
fake setup file from the site. Once the victim installed 
the software, this malware acted as a regular 
ransomware, stole a password, and encrypted the data 
(Khan et al., 2020). However, it also installed the 
password-stealing Trojan Kpot, which purloins “cookies 
and login credentials from web browsers, messaging 
programs, VPNs, email accounts, gaming accounts, and 
other services” (Abrams, 2020b; Trend Micro, 2020a). As 
such, this campaign seems to be only one among others 
that go beyond traditional ransomware activities and 
simultaneously steal information, potentially to 
facilitate a later attack or extortion (Abrams, 2020b).  
 A second noteworthy ransomware campaign 
during this pandemic concerns a tweaked (in this case 
less detectable) variant of the famous Netwalker 
ransomware (formerly Mailto). According to 
Malwarehunterteam, it has used coronavirus lures to 
target various enterprise and government agencies 
(Abrams, 2020c). These notably included the two widely 
reported attacks against the Toll Group and the 
Champaign Urbana Public Health District (CUPHD) in 
Illinois (Abrams, 2020c).  
 Another one is the fuckunicorn ransomware, 
which was observed in a typo-squatting campaign21 
focused on the Italian Federation of Pharmacists (IFP), 
which was a key information provider on the pandemic 
in Italy. Specifically, the ransomware campaign crafted a 
malicious website imitating the IFP site, along with a 
slight variation of the IFP site’s domain name.  Similar to 
other prevalent attacks, users are lured into 
downloading the ransomware that masqueraded as a 
pandemic “dashboard tracker” (Walter, 2020). 
A last noteworthy example is the Winlocker 
ransomware, which was adapted from its 2019 form to 
display a lock screen with a coronavirus image while 
repeatedly/ annoyingly saying “coronavirus” demanding 
a password to regain system access (TrendMicro, 
2020a).  
As mentioned, numerous others have been 
observed in the wild. Among the most prevalent we find 
the Lockbit, CERBER, Wannacry, Sodinokibi, 
Cryptolocker, NanoCore and Ryuk ransomware (Interpol, 
2020b, 2020a; Intsights, 2020; MELANI, 2020). As such, 
most of the ransomware observed in the first half of 
2020 seems to come from pre-existing strands, 
leveraged by well-known actors or widely available on 
the markets. Nonetheless, ransomware – alongside 
phishing and credential stuffing – has been the 
emblematic/prevalent threat during this pandemic. As 
mentioned above, the modus operandi of threats actors 
leveraging these types of attacks has evolved and 
Internet users who incorrectly type a website address into their web 
browser (e.g., “Gooogle.com” instead of “Google.com”) (McAffee, 
2013). 





become more reckless and sophisticated – i.e. targeting 
critical infrastructure, engaging in double extortion and 
shortening penetration to activation time.  
 
Disruptive Malware: Data Wiper/ MBC Rewriter 
 
Another type of observed disruptive malware have been 
boot record rewriters, which wipe a computer’s master 
boot record (MBR) (Cimpanu, 2020f). The information 
security journal ZDNet has identified at least five 
malware strains that use a coronavirus theme and are 
geared towards destruction, rather than financial gain. 
One of them, which used the name “COVID-19.exe”, first 
showed an annoying window that users cannot close as 
Windows Task Manager is disabled all the while it was 
rewriting the master boot code (MBC) (Cimpanu, 2020f). 
A second strain posed as the coronavirus ransomware 
mentioned above before actually rewriting the MBC.  
Furthermore, Malwarehunterteam also found 
two data wipers. The first was spotted in February and 
used a Chinese file name to target Chinese users. It, 
however, remains unclear whether this first case was 
actually distributed in the wild or just a test. The 
second data wiper  was spotted in early April (Cimpanu, 
2020f). 
 
Data Harvesting Malware: Trojan 
 
In terms of data harvesting malware, the majority of 
cases reported during the pandemic fall within the 
Trojan malware family.  Many of these lured their victim 
– in all types of sectors – with WHO or COVID-19 lures. 
Examples include the Formbook, the Hancitor, and 
Gracewire Trojans, which were installed by the Guloader 
and Get2Loader malicious downloader, respectively 
(Abrams, 2020d; Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency and National Cyber Security Centre, 2020; 
McAfee, 2020b). Trojans can take many forms, such as 
(1) remote access Trojans (RATs), (2) banking Trojans, 
and (3) information stealing Trojans.  
(1) RATs are often used for creating and 
maintaining botnets – and thus used for DDoS attacks – 
but also uploading files to an infected device, executing 
scripts, taking screenshots, harvesting keystrokes, 
stealing bitcoin wallets, and collecting browser cookies 
and passwords (CERT-MU, 2020). During this pandemic, 
one of the most reported campaigns included the 
Remcos Trojan, which spread in late March through a 
phishing campaign around loans in the retail and SME 
sectors as well as the Philippines’ Bureau of Customs  (F 
and Scholten, 2020; Intsights, 2020; McAfee, 2020b). 
Other campaigns included the Crimson RAT, the Koadic 
RAT, the Warzone RAT, the Nanocore RAT, IceID, or the 
BlackNET RAT. The latter was disseminated through two 
simple websites promoting fake applications; aptly 
called “antivirus-covid19” and “corona-antivirus” 
(Degrippo, 2020b; Intsights, 2020; McAfee, 2020b; Platt 
et al., 2020; Threat Intelligence Team, 2020; Walter, 
2020).  
One particularly active coronavirus-related 
campaign involved the well-known AgentTesla spyware, 
which collects information about the actions of its 
victims by recording keystrokes and user interactions. 
This new medium-sized campaign posed, among others, 
as the head of the WHO, claiming to have found a 
“solution for COVID-19”. Mostly present in the United 
States, it primarily targeted the manufacturing industry 
but also construction, transportation, healthcare, 
automotive, energy, and aerospace companies 
(Proofpoint, 2020). 
(2) Banking Trojans, meanwhile, tend to try to 
steal credentials to illegally obtain money. Among the 
different Trojan families active during this pandemic, 
reports have highlighted the use of the Trickbot banking 
Trojan in a variety of coronavirus-related campaigns. In 
one example, emails targeted Italian users with a 
document purporting to be information related to 
COVID-19 but instead executed the Trojan (Abrams, 
2020e; Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 
and National Cyber Security Centre, 2020). 
Another noteworthy and active banking Trojan 
has been the Zeus Sphinx malware (aka Zloader or 
Terdot), which after years of lying dormant, has been 
resurrected to capitalize on the pandemic (Osborne, 
2020). According to IBM X-Force, this campaign was 
launched in March and focused on government relief 
payments, notably in the UK, Australia, Brazil, and the 
US (Gandler and Kessem, 2020; Osborne, 2020).  
A last family that has been widely reported on 
has been the Emotet (aka. Geodo or mealybug) Trojan. 
According to antivirus firm McAfee (2020), several 
campaigns used COVID-19-themed phishing (e.g. on 
treatment and research) to deliver the Trojan. They 
notably affected China and Japan in the early months of 
the pandemic and in particular targeted the healthcare 
sector (Trend Micro, 2020b).  
3) Information-stealing Trojans are designed to 
gather information from a system, such as logins, 
usernames, passwords, keystrokes (TrendMicro, n.d.). 
One particularly saliently reported campaign has 
revolved around the relatively new Oski info stealer 
malware. This malware was propagated through a fake 
information app – the “COVID-19 Inform App” – 
allegedly developed by the WHO. Cybercriminals were 
able to hijack routers and change Domain Name System 
(DNS) settings to redirect victims to attacker-controlled 
sites promoting the fake coronavirus information apps 
(Arsene, 2020b; Cimpanu, 2020g; Trend Micro, 2020a). 
These criminals mainly targeted D-Link and Linksys 
products using brute-force attacks to guess the admin 
password of targeted routers (Cimpanu, 2020g). The 
campaign, which allegedly started on 18 March, affected 
over 1000 individuals in the space of one week (Arsene, 
2020b). According to cybersecurity company 
Bitdefender, it mostly affected targets from the US, 





Germany, and France, which were at the time among 
some of the countries most affected by the coronavirus 
outbreak (Arsene, 2020b).  
Cybercriminals have also been active in spreading 
a new variant of the HawkEye Reborn and Lokibot 
malware. The former, which has been revamped with 
extended information-stealing capabilities, has been 
used to target the retail sector through the intermediary 
spam that purports to be an “alert” from the Director-
General of the WHO (Brumaghin and Unterbrink, 2020; 
Seals, 2020). Anecdotally, it has been reported that the 
owner, called MoonD3v, apparently auctioned off this 
malware after he was diagnosed with COVID-19 (Blueliv, 
2020).  
Lokibot  has also been distributed using a WHO-
spoofing spear-phishing campaign, this time ironically 
pertaining to misinformation around the pandemic 
(Saengphaibul, 2020). It is a prolific Trojan infamous for 
being simple, effective, and cheap (it used to be sold for 
as little as 300 USD) (Montalbano, 2020). Since it was 
first detected, the spear-phishing campaign has gone 
global, with Turkey, Portugal, Germany, Austria, and the 
United States showing the highest incidents, while 
Belgium, Puerto Rico, Italy, Canada, and Spain were also 
affected (Montalbano, 2020; Saengphaibul, 2020).  
The last highly reported scheme revolved around 
the interactive coronavirus dashboard maintained by 
Johns Hopkins University. Hackers took advantage of it 
in March and embedded a fake but accurate version of 
the dashboard with the java-based AZORult Trojan 
(Alfasi, 2020; Krebs, 2020d). The kit was notably sold on 
several Russian-language cybercrime forums for 200 to 





Data Harvesting Malware: Crypto Miners 
 
Another type of data-harvesting malware active during 
the early months of this pandemic has been the Lemon 
Duck crypto miner – first spotted in 2019.  In an ongoing 
campaign first observed in March, spammers aimed to 
spread the malware through coronavirus-themed emails 
with weaponized attachments (Trend Micro, 2020c). 
Once a machine had been compromised, the users’ 
Microsoft Outlook account sent emails with malicious 
attachments to their contacts (Trend Micro, 2020c). 
Incidents have been reported in China, Bangladesh, 
Hong Kong, Egypt, and Indonesia, mostly affecting the 
clothing industry, real estate, and health, electronics as 
well asshipping/logistics companies (Trend Micro, 
2020c). 
Later reports have also revealed that APT32 (or 
Ocean Lotus), has been hiding behind a crypto miner to 
target French and Vietnamese government and private 
sector entities (Lakshmanan, 2020).  
2.2.6 Business Email Compromise (BEC) 
 
Amid the plethora of coronavirus-related phishing 
attacks across the globe, one type of threat that has also 
seen some adaptation is business email compromise. 
The scam works by convincing or tricking the targets – 
e.g. by using spoofed supplier or client addresses – into 
making transactions to an intruder who poses as an 
employee working in the same company (Khan et al., 
2020). Indeed, some researchers, the FBI, Europol, and 
other law enforcement agencies have reported that BEC 
scammers have increasingly been using COVID-19 as a 
hook to reinforce the sense of urgency (FBI National 
Press Office, 2020; Peterson, 2020; Trend Micro, 2020a). 
In terms of scale, no definitive figure exists. By way of 
orientation, according to the security company 
Figure 2: Sources of spam by country in Q1 (Scherbakova et al., 2020) 





Symantec, BEC attacks targeted more than 30,700 
organizations in the first quarter of 2020; however, not 
all were approached with a coronavirus lure (Symantec, 
2020).  
One of the earliest reported BEC campaigns 
leveraging the pandemic was perpetrated by the known 
cybercrime group Ancient Tortoise. This campaign is 
believed to be an adaptation of the previous attacks the 
group launched (Gatlan, 2020; Trend Micro, 2020a). 
Operationally, the group first targeted the bank 
accounts before using the customers’ details to send 
them emails to inform customers of a change in banks 
and payment methods due to the coronavirus crisis 
(Gatlan, 2020; Khan et al., 2020).  
In the US, the FBI also provided the following two 
telling examples of BEC (FBI National Press Office, 2020). 
In the first, a US bank received an email allegedly from 
the CEO of a company, who had previously scheduled a 
transfer of one million USD, requesting that the transfer 
date be moved up, and the recipient account be 
changed “due to the Coronavirus outbreak and 
quarantine processes and precautions” (FBI National 
Press Office, 2020). In the second, a bank customer was 
emailed by someone claiming to be one of the 
customer’s clients in China. The client requested that all 
invoice payments be changed to a different bank 
because their regular bank accounts were inaccessible 
due to “Corona Virus audits.” The victim sent several 
wire transfers to the new bank account at a significant 
loss before discovering the fraud.  
2.2.7 (Mal)Spam  
 
Spam, be it by email or text, is one of these nuisances – 
and threats when weaponized – that have existed since 
the Internet’s inception. Cluttering both the Internet 
and most email inboxes, spam accounts for a massive 
volume of emails sent every day and pertains to as many 
subjects as one can think of. Whether in a moment of 
relative calm or an emergency situation, spam has 
always been used on a very large scale by malicious 
actors to advance their cause and interests. The current 
pandemic is no exception.  
In the current epidemic situation, coronavirus-
related spam has been observed on a very large scale 
sent to users as early as February 2020 (Khan et al., 
2020; TrendMicro, 2020a). Indeed, TrendMicro reported 
that in the first quarter of 2020 it had observed nearly 
one million spam messages – mostly in the US – related 
to the pandemic, with a 220 per cent increase between 
February and March (Trend Micro, 2020a). Google, 
meanwhile, reported that in early April its Gmail 
networks were seeing over 240 million coronavirus 
spam messages daily, without accounting for an 
additional daily 18 million phishing and malspam emails 
(Kumaran and Lugani, 2020).  
According to the cybersecurity company 
Kaspersky, in first quarter of 2020, Russia was the first 
country by the amount of outgoing spam. It was 
followed by the US, Germany, France, and China 
(traditionally in the top 3) (see. Figure 1.) (Shcherbakova 
et al., 2020). 
Examples of (mal)spam are legion, 
characterized by different degrees of sophistication (and 
typos). Among these cases, the themes and lures are 
similar to those mentioned above regarding phishing 
(e.g. WHO spoofing, COVID-19 remedies, etc.). For 
instance, one very common example includes spammers 
pretending to be the WHO by spoofing an official email 
address by using the domain name extension “.int” 
instead of the official “.org” and asking for donations in 
bitcoins (WHO, 2020b). Another one impersonated the 
Colombian government with a weaponized attachment 
disguised in the form of a map of infected 
neighborhoods (Szocs and Bejean, 2020). With large 
parts of the population staying at home and ordering 
food or other goods online during the initial lockdown 
put in place in many countries, malspammers have also 
sent emails pertaining to shipping transaction, either 
about postponement due to the spread of the disease or 
messages that provided a shipping update 
(Shcherbakova, 2020; TrendMicro, 2020a). Spam has 
also been used to spread and exploit fear, paranoia, and 
naivety in whimsical ways. For instance, one spam 
campaign pushed out a video ad for a bogus doomsday 
survival course in the wild (F and Scholten, 2020).  
As the pandemic progressed, researchers have 
also observed a gradual evolution in the type of 
(mal)spam campaigns out there. According to Symantec 
researchers, the first wave, which arose in early March, 
comprised mostly of coronavirus-related (mal)spam and 
phishing emails (Thaware, 2020a). These messages 
distributed a variety of malware (discussed in section 
2.2.4), from generic to custom-built Trojans, information 
stealers, and malicious downloaders. Still, according to 
Symantec, there was a sharp uptick in the number of 
malicious emails (in the US) on 16 March, with a surge 
of spam campaigns focused around selling face masks, 
medical equipment, immunity oil, and other products 
related to the coronavirus outbreak (Thaware, 2020a). 
This increase closely corresponded with the rise in the 
number of COVID-19 infections recorded in Europe and 
the US as well as a sudden shift in the US public 
perception of the related risks (e.g. looting and hoarding 
in some regions) (Thaware, 2020a). 
In the following weeks, a second wave of spam 
emails took over in the form of so-called snowshoes 
spam. It remained the predominant/favorite type at 
least until May (Thaware, 2020a, 2020b). These 
campaigns tended to appear with heavy randomization 
in the header fields to avoid detection and come in large 
batches in a short period of time. These spam volleys 
have used a myriad of topics and themes, such as “Elon 
Musk Reveals How to Profit from coronavirus” and the 
promotion of a “Touch Free Body Thermometer” 
(Thaware, 2020b). 





2.2.8 Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS)  
 
In the context of the pandemic, the number – and in 
some cases the severity – of DDoS attacks has also 
increased worldwide (Europol, 2020d; Hope, 2020a; 
Nexusguard, 2020). Indeed, according to the 
cybersecurity firm Nexusguard, DDoS attacks within the 
first quarter of 2020 increased by 542 per cent 
compared to the last quarter of 2019 and by 278 per 
cent compared to the same period in the previous year 
(Nexusguard, 2020). According to Kaspersky, in Q1 and 
Q2, the average number of attacks per day increased by 
almost 30 per cent compared to the previous reporting 
period (Kupreev et al., 2020). A similar trend has been 
confirmed by the security firms Cloudflare and Netscout, 
which noted that the increase grew in parallel to the 
pandemic – i.e. with a big spike between 11 March and 
11 April 2020 (over 864,000) (Dobbins and Hummel, 
2020; Yoachimik and Singh, 2020).  
On top of that, researchers at Kaspersky added 
that the increase in DDoS attacks from Q1 2020 and Q2 
2020 grew about 5 per cent (Zurier, 2020). Despite being 
a small rise it is unusual as past years trends have seen 
Q1 being lower than Q2. In addition, compared to the 
same period of Q2 2019, DDoS attacks grew more than 
threefold (Zurier, 2020). Moreover, they also noted that 
in Q1 2020, the average duration of DDoS attacks also 
grew; with attacks lasting 25 per cent longer than in Q1 
2019 (Zurier, 2020). 
In terms of attack geography, trends in Q1 and 
Q2 are very similar. The top five places in terms of both 
the number of targets and the number of attacks were 
occupied by China (approx. 61 per cent), the United 
States (approx. 19 per cent), Hong Kong, China (approx. 
6 per cent), South Africa (approx. 1.5 per cent) and 
Singapore (approx. 1 per cent) (Kupreev et al., 2020). 
Switzerland, meanwhile, did not record any significant 
increase in DDoS attacks during the first half of the year 
(MELANI, 2020).   
Compared to previous DDoS attacks that were 
conducted against public-facing resources of 
companies, attacks during the pandemic have targeted 
internal infrastructures of companies, such as their VPN 
or email servers – often obfuscating more malicious and 
harmful infiltrations of an organization’s resources 
(Burt, 2020).  
In terms of targets, one well-reported DDoS 
attack was the – supposedly state-sponsored –  15 
March DDoS attack that affected and attempted to 
disrupt the US Department of Health and Human 
Service’s online services and its pandemic response 
activities (Stein and Jacobs, 2020). According to various 
official sources – e.g. Health and Human Services 
Secretary Alex Azar – the attack was unsuccessful (Stein 
and Jacobs, 2020). As a side note, various networks and 
companies, such as T-Mobile, Verizon, A&T, and Sprint 
thought they were being targeted by a coordinated 
DDoS attack in mid-June. The attack, however, was later 
debunked and due to a misconfiguration on T-Mobile’s 
end (Raywood, 2020).  
Amazon Web Services (AWS) also reported the 
mitigation of a 2.2 terabit-sized DDoS strike in February, 
Figure 3: Number of COVID-19-related malicious files for Q1 and Q2 (McAfee, 2020c) 





which would have rendered thousands of their hosted 
clients useless for an unknown time period (AWS Shield, 
2020). Despite not being the only victim of the attacks, 
its size was nonetheless highly unusual and represented 
a 44 per cent increase in any data volume previously 
recorded on their network (AWS Shield, 2020; Bytagig, 
2020). 
AWS was not the only one to have experienced such 
a major attack. Indeed, in Europe, the network host 
Akamai discovered and thwarted a DDoS attack attempt 
against a European bank in June. Specifically, the strike 
attempted to overload the network with over 800 
million packets per second (PPS). This was not the 
traditional form of DDoS attack, which usually strikes 
with BPS (bits per second) attacks, targeting, and 
overwhelming networks. A PPS-approach instead seeks 
to drain network resources (Bytagig, 2020; Emmons, 
2020). In addition, network provider Akamai also 
reported that it had thwarted a 1.44 Tbps attack in the 
first week of June 2020 (Emmons, 2020).  
This is not the only unusual activity reported; 
researchers from the cybersecurity provider 
Nexusguard also discovered various abnormal traffic 
patterns, including small-sized, short attacks known as 
“invisible killers” which most ISPs overlook thus allowing 
the attackers to cut through to online services and cause 
disruption (Hope, 2020a; Nexusguard, 2020). 
A last type of DDoS attacks observed during the 
coronavirus pandemic has been “ransom DDoS” or 
“extortion by DDoS”, where threat actors threaten an 
organization with a massive DDoS attack if it does not 
pay up. These types of attacks had subsided in the past 
years but have been on the rise again – particularly since 
July/August (Muncaster, 2020e; Radware, 2020). Threat 
actors, such as the Armada collective and Fancy Bear – 
and some copycats –targeted businesses in the e-
commerce, finance, and travel sectors in North America, 
Asia pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.  
*** 
As mentioned earlier in section 1.2.2, in the first 
six months of 2020 the scale, sophistication, and modus 
operandi of certain cyber threats have evolved to adapt 
to the pandemic environment. This notably includes the 
(re-)emergence of double extortion ransomware, of old 
malware such as Zeus, stronger DDoS attacks as well as 
increasing attacks against cloud services and VPNs. 
However, as previously for the actors, the types of cyber 
threats – at least those exploiting COVID-19 – are more 
of the same. Most of the detected malware groups were 
active and known before the pandemic and little 
innovation in terms of actual attack techniques, tools 
and procedures has been observed. Instead, the attacks 
were merely re-adapted to fit the pandemic and exploit 
the situation to the maximum.   
 
2.3 Distribution and Types of Targets  
Concurrent with the large volume of coronavirus-related 
cyberattacks, the number, distribution, and type of 
targets affected were similarly large and diverse. 
“Targets” is a large category referencing anyone or 
anything being affected by cyberattacks. As such, it can 
be divided into at least three different levels of 
granularity, ranging from the country level, down to 
sectors, and eventually individual actors.  
The following paragraphs describe, exemplify, 
and tentatively quantify these levels, namely the states, 
sectors, and types of individuals that were primarily 
targeted by coronavirus-related cyberattacks. As a 
caveat, quantifying and qualifying targets is, due to 
incomplete or lacking data, often a delicate affair and 
the following sections only aim to provide a general 
indication as to the general trend during the first six 
months of 2020. In addition, the chosen set of affected 
sectors is far from exhaustive and only aims to highlight 
those most affected.  
2.3.1 Geographical Distribution of Attacks/ Targets 
Understanding the geographical distribution of 
cyberattacks is essential to provide a more complete 
view of the cyber threat landscape – differentiating 
between perceptions of threats and actual threats. It 
allows to identify those regions or countries most 
affected and thus at risk from certain types of attacks; 
thus helping policymakers to put in place the necessary 
counter-measures to enhance their cybersecurity. 
Additionally, it also helps to ascertain different regional 
trends and patterns in adversarial behavior.  
As such, in terms of the geographical distribution 
of the targets, researchers have observed – similarly to 
the pandemic itself – the truly global reach and dynamic 
nature of coronavirus-related cyberattacks. Perhaps 
obvious, but these cyberattacks seem to have closely 
followed the spread of the coronavirus, mostly targeting 
countries that had started suffering an increase in 
COVID-19 cases (Arsene, 2020a; Guirakhoo, 2020b). In 
March, for instance, researchers at Proofpoint observed 
that several countries were particularly affected, such as 
Italy, the Czech Republic, Japan, the UK, Spain, France, 
India, Romania, Thailand, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Turkey  (Arsene, 2020a; F and Scholten, 
2020). At the time, all of these countries were seeing a 
very steep increase in the number of cases and 
hospitalizations due to COVID-19. These connections 
further highlight the continuing adaptation capacity of 
threats actors already underlined in section 1.3  
Regarding the extent to which these countries 
were affected, one can for instance turn towards anti-
virus statistics for a glimpse of the reality. According to 
Kaspersky and its email anti-virus, Spain had the highest 
number of malware “trigger events” in Q1 2020 and 





accounted for 9.66 per cent of all users of Kaspersky’s 
security solutions who encountered email malware 
worldwide. Second place went to Germany (8.53 per 
cent), and Russia (6.26 per cent) ranked third 
(Shcherbakova et al., 2020).  
According to McAfee’s COVID-19 threat 
dashboard (see figure 4)22 that tracks COVID-19-related 
malicious file detections, Spain remained the most 
affected country during Q1 and Q2, with about 460,000 
malicious detections (at the time of writing). The 
leaderboard afterward however is different (see figure 
2) (McAfee, 2020c). Incidentally, the disclosed incidents 
targeting the US in Q1 2020 rose 61 per cent compared 
to the previous quarter (McAfee, 2020b), making it one 
of the countries most-hit by coronavirus-related 
cyberattacks – after Spain. 
While many of the COVID-19-related cyber 
threats have been shared across the world (e.g. phishing 
or ransomware), not all countries were affected to the 
same extent and by the same threats – reflecting both 
the adaptation capacity of threat actors but also 
different  regional trends – depending on regional 
capacity, opportunities, or financial interests. In that 
regard, a number of regional cybercrime trends can be 
highlighted. According to the Global Assessment Report 
on COVID-19 related Cybercrime published by 
INTERPOL’s Cybercrime Directorate,23 Europe was 
particularly targeted, most notably by (credential) 
phishing, spoofing of official websites, and ransomware 
against critical infrastructure operators (Interpol, 
2020b).  In the Americas, countries were particularly 
affected by COVID-19-based phishing and fraud, which 
included the use of remote access hacks, ransomware 
against SMEs (e.g. Lockbit), as well as child exploitation. 
African countries reported increased cyberattacks 
against online payments, COVID-19-related phishing, 
and extortion. Countries in Asia and  the South Pacific 
reported fraud and phishing campaigns as well as the 
illegal online sale of fake medical supplies, drugs and 
personal protective equipment. The Middle East and 
North African regions were also hit by an increasing 
number of phishing, online fraud, malicious domains 
and scams. All regions reported mis- and disinformation 
on social media. As highlighted in Europol’s latest 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2020d), none of 
these threats were in themselves new to the different 
regions. In most cases, COVID-19 has only amplified the 
intensity of some pre-existing threats (e.g. phishing, 
ransomware, and scams) – while diverting effort and 
resources from others.   
                                                                
22 The data comes from McAfee’s Advanced Programs Group (APG). 
The dashboard is constantly updated and the numbers indicated were 
those that had been reported at the time of writing in mid-July 2020.  
2.3.2 Most Targeted Sectors: Public, Health, 
Education, and Financial Sectors 
According to public reporting, cyber malicious actors 
have spared no one and no sector with their 
coronavirus-related cyberattacks. Indeed, sectors from 
retail to energy as well as construction or transport have 
been targeted and affected, directly or indirectly, by 
these attacks. However, some sectors need to be 
highlighted as to the intensity with which they were (and 
probably continue to be) targeted and the (potential) 
impact these attacks have had. These are the public 
sector, the health sector, the education sector, and the 
financial sector.  
Public Sector 
 
The public sector, particularly those entities related to 
the crisis response, such as task forces or health 
agencies, have been continuously targeted by threat 
actors during this pandemic, whether for espionage, 
disruption, or profit.  
According to McAfee’s threat report, incidents 
detected in the public sector during the first quarter of 
2020 increased by 73 per cent – compared to the 
previous quarter (McAfee, 2020b). While not globally 
representative, this trend is illustrated in new data 
found in the Australian Cybersecurity Strategy 2020; in 
the past year – from Q3 2019 to Q2 2020 – Australia’s 
governmental and public entities were targeted in 35.4 
per cent of the incidents its cybersecurity center 
responded to. Organizations classified as critical 
infrastructure are second with 35 per cent (Australian 
Government, 2020).  
Among the many types of attacks, many of which 
are opportunistic ransomware, scams or DDoS attacks 
(e.g. HHS case), one notable trend includes attacks 
against the new medical equipment procurement 
structures that have been developed to respond to the 
outbreak (Zaboeva, 2020). IBM’s X-Force Incident 
Response and Intelligence Service uncovered and 
documented a widespread campaign targeting 
approximately 40 critical organizations in Germany in an 
effort to disrupt operations and extract sensitive 
information on their activities. Spear-phishing emails 
were sent to over a hundred high-level executives at the 
targeted organizations, which included an unnamed 
German corporation tied to the procurement of 
personal protective equipment (Walter, 2020). 
 
23 Conducted from April to May 2020 with 48 out of 194 member 
countries responding to the Survey and 4 out of 13 private partners 
contributing their data to the report. 




















The healthcare sector has also been under stress and 
threat both physically (i.e. overwhelmed with patients) 
and in cyberspace. Indeed, since the start of the 
pandemic hackers have relentlessly targeted networks, 
endpoints, and IoT devices of healthcare organizations, 
hospitals, and clinics, pharmaceutical institutions, and 
distributors of medical equipment. These have led to 
considerable disruption and at least one fatality24 (Sara 
Coble, 2020). This activity reached such levels that public 
authorities (e.g. in the UK and the US), international 
organizations (e.g. the International Committee of the 
Red Cross), NGOs (e.g. the CyberPeace Institute) and 
(former) political leaders across the world have made 
several public calls to stop such attacks.  
A number of high-level cases have been reported 
across the world, affecting countries such as the UK, US, 
France, Italy, Portugal, Spain or the Czech Republic.25 
Figure 5 provides an overview of the main attacks during 
the month of March, which recorded a peak of 
cyberattacks against the healthcare sector. In terms of 
numbers, the threat intelligence firm Recorded Future  
                                                                
24 This incident, which happened outside of the timeframe analyzed 
for this study, in September 2020, saw the Düsseldorf university clinic 
fall victim to the crypto locker DoppelPaymer, which has since been 
linked to a Russian threat actor. As a result, the hospital had to divert 
 
 
has catalogued 26 ransomware attacks against 
healthcare providers in the US in Q1 and Q2 2020, with 
attacks being up for every month in  year-on-year 
comparisons (Liska, 2020b). In Europe, those numbers 
appear to be on the rise as well (Liska, 2020b).  
In addition to being the target of media, 
governmental and individual attention pertaining to the 
pandemic, the WHO has also been the target of a very 
high number of cyberattacks. According to its own CISO, 
Flavio Aggio, since the pandemic began, the 
cyberattacks against the WHO have increased at least 
fivefold (WHO, 2020a). Among the campaigns that have 
received most media coverage one finds the 
aforementioned one attributed to DarkHotel, which, 
among other things , registered a fake WHO email 
address and website in March after several failed 
attempts to steal employee credentials (Intsights, 2020). 
Another attack resulted in some 450 active WHO email 
addresses and passwords being leaked online along with 
thousands belonging to others working on the response 
to the novel coronavirus (WHO, 2020a).  
patients, one of whom was searching urgent care which the digitally 
affected clinic was unable to provide, leading to her death. 
25 For a greater overview of all (not only cyber-related) security 
incident against the healthcare sector see the Safecare project.   
Figure 4: Timeline of major cyberattacks against healthcare infrastructure in March 2020 (author’s design) 





In addition, medical research centers – notably 
working on a possible vaccine – have also been the 
target of cyberattacks. This includes a set of 
supercomputing centers across Europe, some of which 
were involved in projects related to the coronavirus, and 
whose disruption might have impacted or delayed 
research. The extent to which these incidents are 
correlated remains uncertain, though reports by media 
outlets and cybersecurity companies have speculated 
that they are (GreAT, 2020b). The British 
supercomputing center ARCHER, the German based 
bwHPC, and the Swiss National Supercomputing Center 
at the ETH Zurich all were affected by security events 
caused by intrusion attempts in early May. According to 
an alert made by the European Grid Infrastructure CSIRT 
– which studied two of the incidents – these were 
targeted by crypto-mining malware for CPU mining 
purposes (EGI CSIRT, 2020).  
 
Education Sector 
As for many businesses, many (often unprepared) 
educational institutions were taken aback by the 
pandemic and had to quickly adapt their logistics to offer 
continuous learning to their pupils. As a result, many 
have resorted to various online tools such as Zoom. As 
mentioned earlier, due to their widespread use these 
solutions were particularly targeted by different threat 
actors, whether for cyberespionage, cybercrime or 
simply disruption. Regarding the latter, a number of 
Zoom bombings of classes or PhD defenses have been 
reported.  
In addition to the targeting of educational online 
tools (and their inherent vulnerabilities), the 
educational sector has also been the victim of a 
considerable amount of spear-phishing attacks. These 
were driven, in part, by the constant exchange of and 
need for information by the faculty, staff, professorial 
and student bodies on the pandemic, the logistics and 
future plans (Arsene, 2020a).  
Examples include the Formbook campaigns, which have 
been targeting educational institutions via phishing 
messages with a trojanized application for teachers 
(Walter, 2020). 
The success of these phishing attempts seemed 
to have been reinforced by the fact that many 
educational institutions do not have strong cyber 
awareness, logistics, or practices. For example, 
according to the security firm Tessian, 40 per cent of the 
top 20 US universities are not using domain-based 
message authentication, reporting and conformance 
(DMARC) records at all. The remaining 60 per cent have 
implemented DMARC but have not set up policies to 
“quarantine” or “reject” any emails from unauthorized 
senders using their domains (Barth, 2020). As a result, 
many emails and domains can be spoofed to lure 
students or employees of a university to a phishing 
website designed to steal credentials or trick victims into 




As for the education sector, the financial one has also 
been particularly affected by coronavirus-related 
cyberattacks, whether due to widespread use of 
teleworking infrastructure or other types of attacks, 
such as ransomwares. One emblematic attack has been 
the Ryuk ransomware attack against the international 
financial technology service provider Finastra in March. 
After the health sector, the financial one has 
been one of the most targeted sectors by ransomware. 
According to the cybersecurity firm Carbon Black, 
attacks on financial institutions registered an increase of 
238 per cent between the beginning of February and the 
end of April  (Upatham and Treinen, 2020). Similarly, in 
April, the Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (2020) identified over 1500 high-risk 
domains, created on or after 1 January 2020, containing 
both a coronavirus and financial theme. Many of these 
were used by malicious actors to install Trojans or phish 
financial credentials from bank customers across the 
world. In addition, there has also been an increase in 
banking call center fraud, where fraudsters impersonate 
customers or make false insurance claims (Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network, 2020). 
On top of the financial risks these cyberattacks 
create for both financial institutions and their clients, 
the exploitation of critical vulnerabilities has enabled 
both money laundering and terrorist financing, 
according to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 
2020). This is mainly due to the increased misuse of 
online financial services and virtual assets to move and 
conceal illicit funds as well as the possible corruption 
connected with governmental stimulus funds or 
international financial assistance (Crisanto and Prenio, 
2020).  
2.3.3 Targeted Individuals 
Due to the different nature and rhythms of lockdowns 
and shifts to remote working (see section 1.1), 
individuals in general – whether working from home or 
only staying at home – have been relatively easy targets 
for threat actors. Particularly those individuals with 
limited risk awareness, user experience, or online 
literacy/ competence, such as children and the elderly. 
Indeed, one group particularly at risk, vulnerable 
and targeted were children, many of which found 
themselves lock-down at home and engaged in 
considerably more and new online activity, whether for 
e-schooling or entertainment. In addition, children were 
more isolated and less supervised than usual while 
content moderation efforts were weakened (due to 
remote office) and automated. As a result, children have 





been considerably more exposed to threats coming 
from the Internet, such as file-sharing abuse, 
inappropriate content, cyberbullying, or the grooming of 
children for sexual purposes (Radoini, 2020; UNICEF, 
2020). This is particularly the case for younger children 
(i.e. under the age of 13), who might not have been 
familiar with or prepared for the various social 
networking tools, many of which were not designed for 
them and thus lack online safeguarding policies (UNICEF, 
2020).  
The elderly, many of whom were already gripped 
by fear and abused offline, have also been particularly 
targeted and abused online. This vulnerable group that 
more commonly relies on offline shopping and is less 
cybersecurity aware, had to adapt and increasingly 
engage in online activities without supervision or 
support (e.g. for shopping), making them more exposed 
to scams, hoaxes, and other cyber threats, whether 
untargeted or directed at them (Radoini, 2020).  
The youth and the elderly are of course not the 
only victims. Many – if not most – of the victims of 
cyberattacks belong to the more digitally connected 
generations. According to a study of COVID-19-related 
online scams and fraud in Switzerland, the bulk of the 
victims were between 31 and 50 years old (Soguel, 
2020). Meanwhile, according to a study by the 
cybersecurity firm SentryBay, at least 40 per cent of the 
UK workforce working from home during the pandemic 
have been victim or had to face attempts of cybercrime 
(e.g. phishing) (Canter, 2020). As imperfect and 
incomplete as these results might be, they only tend to 
illustrate the extent to which malicious activities have 
targeted a great deal of the population – particularly 
those parts of the active workforce working from home. 
*** 
The targets of coronavirus-related cyberattacks 
echo the various changes in terms of targets laid out in 
section 1.2.3; namely, that malicious actors have acted 
opportunistically and targeted countries most affected 
by the pandemic and that to maximize damage, financial 
and strategic gains, they have shifted their target sets 
from individuals and small businesses to major 
corporations, governments, and critical infrastructure 
organizations that play a crucial role in responding to the 
outbreak. These most notably include (but are not 
limited to) the public, healthcare, and financial sectors 
as well as academic/education institutions. While such 
sectors and critical entities have been the targets of 
attacks in the past, the intensity with which they are 
now attacked constitutes a qualitative change.  
  







The coronavirus pandemic has affected not only the 
social and work lives of millions but also the cyber threat 
landscape. Compared to previous crises, it has 
generated a set of remarkable and unique societal, 
technical, logistical, and economic circumstances upon 
which malicious actors – ranging from amateur 
cybercriminals to sophisticated state-sponsored threat 
actors – have capitalized to further their financial and 
strategic aims. There are three such factors, all of which 
are likely to endure as we move forward. These factors 
are:  
1. an expanded socio-technical attack surface 
due to the greater use and dependency on 
services and applications for telework 
provided through digital infrastructure in 
general and cloud infrastructure in particular;   
2. an psycho-informational environment 
characterized by anxiety, uncertainty, and 
high demand for information;  
3. a nexus of economic and trade uncertainty/ 
disruption, emergency procurement 
processes compounded by the wide 
availability of nefarious cyber tools.  
In terms of the COVID-19-related cyber threat 
landscape, this report has found that cybercriminals and 
state-sponsored actors have both been very active in 
leveraging the pandemic. A surge in amateur and largely 
unsophisticated cyberattacks (e.g. phishing) was notably 
observed. Meanwhile, a plethora of professional 
cybercrime groups (e.g. Maze, Doppelpaymer, Ryuk, 
etc.) have also leveraged the pandemic and deployed 
ploys linked to the coronavirus. Moreover, state-
sponsored cyber actors locked into ongoing rivalries or 
conflicts have also leveraged the pandemic to their 
ends. Some of them have also pursued  pandemic-
related strategic targets, such as health institutions or 
organizations in Wuhan.  
The types of threats that exploited the pandemic 
are varied, with reports highlighting a spectrum ranging 
from large-scale and indiscriminate credential phishing, 
malspam, and scam campaigns to targeted spear-
phishing, ransomware, DDoS or BEC attacks. 
Teleworking infrastructures, such as cloud based 
services, RDP connections or VPNs have also been 
subjects to intense attacks. Mobile threats, such as 
malware-loaded contact-tracing applications, have also 
been prevalent.  
Targets have shown to be similarly diverse, with 
some of the most affected ones being individual users 
(including vulnerable groups like children, and the 
elderly), the public sector alongside certain critical 
infrastructure operators, especially healthcare and 
financial institutions. Following an opportunistic logic, 
the most affected countries have been those that were 
the most affected by the virus, such as Spain, Italy, the 
US, India, or Japan. As such, the cyberattacks have 
followed and adapted alongside the geographic spread 
of the virus. 
The continuously dynamic nature of cyber 
threats is reflected in the transformation the landscape 
has undergone in response to the pandemic in the first 
six months of 2020. Among the numerous – mostly 
qualitative – changes in adversarial behavior, this report 
generally found that:  
1. The coronavirus pandemic has forced a 
number of threat actors to adapt their 
criminal business model, particularly those 
in targeting sectors affected by restrictions 
or that required an in-person or physical 
element to their ploy.  
2. The scale and sophistication of cyberattacks 
have increased, while certain actors have 
changed their modus operandi. This applies 
in particular to ransomware, where threat 
actors have increasingly resorted to double 
extortion methods and reduced encryption 
activation times in order to maximize their 
profit in an uncertain climate, an 
aggressiveness that is also reflected in DDoS 
attacks that have grown more intense.  
3. The geographical distribution and types of 
targets have been opportunistic, targeting 
mainly those most affected and under 
pressure by the pandemic (e.g. the public, 
sector, the healthcare and education sector, 
or teleworking services), while shifting away 
(for now) from individuals and small 
businesses. 
4. The first six months of the pandemic have 
expanded the motivations for state-
sponsored actors to include coronavirus-
related espionage (e.g. on vaccine research 
or infection rates) and targeting healthcare 
and critical research infrastructure. The 
extent to which this serves as a premise for 
the future will remain to be seen. 
Despite these important changes, the cyber 
threat landscape of Q1 and Q2 shares many similarities 
with trends predating the pandemic. It is thus relatively 
continuous, both qualitatively and quantitatively, when 
referred to the dynamism, adaptability and types of 
attacks, the types of threat actors, or the overall volume 
of certain cyber threats. Most notably, despite general 
reporting of an unprecedented wave of phishing, COVID-
19-related phishing and malspam represented only a 
small share of the overall volumes.  






Overall, the cyber threat landscape of Q1 and Q2 
2020 – operating under the above-mentioned special 
circumstances – is characterized by heightened risks and 
threats. The first wave of the pandemic has offered new 
opportunities for attacks, many of which relate 
specifically to the coronavirus while others have been 
leveraged for all types of attacks. The early months of 
the pandemic have also led to an expanded attack 
surface, thanks notably to the increasing digitization and 
its underlining use and dependence on digital 
infrastructure (e.g. cloud-based services, telework, etc.).  
While some qualification of threat perspectives 
has set in following an initial rise of blanket concern, 
new infection waves, vaccine testing, and new rounds of 
financial aids provide ample opportunities for abuse. 
Even though some socio-technical factors might have 
evolved – or been less prevalent – since Q1 and Q2, their 
underlining driving forces have not. The climate will 
remain characterized by uncertainty, tension, and 
mistrust.  Meanwhile, telework – and all its implications 
in terms of network security and cybersecurity – will also 
become more of the norm.  
As such, this report aims to highlight three key 
recommendations in times of increased threat levels: 
1. As economic pressure will become more 
structural and various cyber threats continue 
to mature and adapt, the importance of 
cybersecurity awareness-raising, capacity 
building, and communication with all 
stakeholders will be critical. Particular 
efforts should be made around 
authentications methods and basic cyber-
hygiene, both of which could undermine the 
development and spread of credential 
phishing/stealing.  
2. The importance of information exchange, 
cooperation, and coordination between all 
stakeholders cannot be sufficiently 
underlined. Such initiatives (e.g. round 
tables and bottom-up mobilization) are 
critical for fostering a better understanding 
and more comprehensive view of the 
evolving cyber threat landscape, bridging 
institutional gaps, and fostering trust. The 
various stakeholders should therefore aim at 
continuing and building upon these efforts in 
the future.  
3. The accelerated digitization and adoption of 
telework has brought the issues of remote 
and cloud security to the forefront of 
cybersecurity. Besides all the security flaws 
and vulnerabilities linked to widely popular 
cloud-based applications – that need to be 
addressed by the responsible actors – users 
and companies, especially SMEs, need to 
start addressing the issues around the use of 
personal devices and the secure 
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Annex 1: Abbreviations 
 
APT Advanced Persistent 
Threat 
BEC Business Email 
Compromise 
C&C Command and Control 
CDC Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention 
CSE Communication Security 
Establishment Canada 
DDoS Distributed Denial of 
Service 
CIO Cyber-enabled Influence 
Operation 
DNS Domain Name System 
DMARC Domain-based Message 
Authentication, Reporting 
& Conformance 
ECSO European Cyber Security 
Organisation 
ENISA European Union Agency 
for Cybersecurity 
FOPH Federal Office of Public 
Health of the Swiss 
Confederation 
GRU Main Directorate of the 
General Staff of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian 
Federation 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITU International 
Telecommunication Union 
NCSC UK National Cybersecurity 
Center 
NSA US National Security 
Agency 
RAT Remote Access Trojan 
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol 
SME Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
 
  





Annex 2: Glossary 
 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): A threat that 
targets critical objectives to gain access to a computer 
system.  Once inside a network, it tries to remain hidden 
and is usually difficult to remove when discovered 
(Command Five Pty Ltd, 2011; DellSecureWorks, 2014) 
Bitcoin: Cryptocurrency and digital payment 
system working on the peer to peer system and without 
any central institution (Bitcoin.org, 2018) 
Botnet or bot: Network of infected computers 
which can be accessed remotely and controlled centrally 
in order to launch coordinated attacks (Ghernaouti-
Hélie, 2013, p. 427). 
Command and Control (C2): “The exercise of 
authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander  over assigned  and  attached forces  in  the  
accomplishment  of  the  mission” (US Department of 
Defense, 2017, p. 43). 
Command and Control infrastructure (C&C): A 
server through which the person controlling malware 
communicates with it in order to send commands and 
retrieve data (QinetiQ Ltd, 2014, p. 2). 
Cyber hygiene: Analogy to personal hygiene with 
regard to one’s security and practices in cyberspace in 
order to protect networks and personal computers 
(European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security, 2016). 
Data breach: Event in which information of a 
sensitive nature is stolen from a network without the 
users’ knowledge (TrendMicro, 2017). 
Deepfake: A Video or audio file modified in which 
a person, object or environment is changed with the 
help of advanced software (Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation, 2019). 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): The act of 
overwhelming a system with a large number of packets 
through the simultaneous use of infected computers 
(Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 431). 
Domain Name Service (DNS): The address 
structure that translates Internet Protocol addresses 
into a string of letters that is easier to remember and use 
(Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and 
Numbers, 2016). 
Domain Name Service (DNS) hijacking: A form 
of website defacement also referred to as DNS 
redirection, where a malicious attacker obtains 
unauthorized access to victims’ computers and changes 
their DNS settings to another DNS server, which 
redirects victims to malicious websites (Srikanth, 2017). 
Dropper: Element to disguise a malware into a 
legitimate application or file (Symantec Corporation, 
2002). 
Exploit: An attack on a computer operating 
system using a vulnerability of the system or software 
(Rouse, 2017a). 
Hack: Act of entering a system without 
authorization (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 433). 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): A system 
used to observe for malicious traffic on a computer 
network (TechTerms, 2016) 
Keylogger: Feature that traces keystrokes 
without the knowledge of the user (Novetta, 2016, p. 
56). 
Machine learning: An artificial intelligence that 
can learn from the data it receives and predict outcomes 
without the need to be reprogrammed (Rouse, 2017b). 
Malware: Malicious software that can take the 
form of a virus, a worm or a Trojan horse (Collins and 
McCombie, 2012, p. 81). 
Malware family: A collection of malware that 
share a significant amount of code (FireEye Inc., 2014, p. 
21). 
Master Boot Record (MBR): Information stored 
on the first sector of the hard disc, identifying the 
location of the system to load it in the main storage 
(Novetta, 2016, p. 56). 
Patch: Software update that repairs one or 
several identified vulnerabilities (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 
2013, p. 437). 
Payload: The part of malware that causes 
harmful results (PCmag, 2016a). 
Ransomware: Malware that locks the user’s 
computer system and only unlocks it when a ransom is 
paid (Trend Micro, 2017). 
Remote Administration or Access Tool (RAT): 
Software granting remote access and control to a 
computer without having physical access to it. RAT can 
be legitimate software, but also malicious (Siciliano, 
2015). 





Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP): A Microsoft’s 
protocol to be able to access another computer’s 
desktop (PCmag, 2016b). 
Script kiddies: Attackers who use cybertools 
that have been developed by more experienced and 
sophisticated hackers. Their main motive is to gain 
attention (PCtools, 2016). 
Social bots: Bot is a shorter term for robot. It is 
an automated program that runs routine tasks on social 
media but can also define fake social media accounts 
that are used to repost messages or news and/or to 
spam (Chu et al., 2012; Hegelich, 2016). 
Social engineering: a non-technical strategy 
cyber attackers use that relies heavily on human 
interaction and often involves tricking people into 
breaking standard security practices (Lord, 2015). 
Spamming: Messages, comments or posts sent 
in large quantities via email or on social media 
(Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 440). 
Spear-phishing: A sophisticated phishing 
technique that not only imitates legitimate webpages, 
but also selects potential targets and adapts malicious 
emails to them. Emails often look like they come from a 
colleague or a legitimate company (Ghernaouti-Hélie, 
2013, p. 440). 
Spoofing: Act of usurping IP addresses in order 
to commit malicious acts such as breaching a network 
(Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 440). 
Trojan horse: Malware hidden in a legitimate 
program in order to infect and hijack a system 
(Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 441). 
Virus: Malicious program with the capacity to 
multiply itself and to impair an infected system. Its 
purpose is also to spread to other networks 
(Ghernaouti-Hélie, 2013, p. 442). 
Virtual Private Network (VPN): Private network 
within a public network that uses encryption to remain 
private (PCmag, 2016c). 
Wiper: Feature that completely erases data 
from a hard disk (Novetta, 2016, p. 57). 
 
